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Preface
Knowledge and knowledge-based value creation processes play an increasing role in
modern economies. In the last two decades investments in knowledge have gained
importance relative to investments in physical assets. The OECD reports that private and
public investments in knowledge as percentage of GDP have increased by 0.7 percentage
points in OECD countries during the years 1997-2004. At the same time, investments
in physical assets such as machinery and equipment have decreased by 1.1 percentage
points.1 The increasing importance of intangible assets in the value creation process
presents a significant challenge for innovation policies in knowledge-based economies.
Innovative firms that intensely invest in research and development (R&D) highly rely on
intangible assets and are faced with serious market failures. These frictions can restrict
R&D intensive firms’ innovation and internationalization activities and are expected to
hamper overall technological progress and economic growth.
Imperfect financial markets that are characterized by information asymmetries can
restrict the access to finance for R&D intensive start-up firms. These firms have only short
track records and due to their focus on R&D, they have only few tangible assets that can
be used as collateral for financial investors. Thus, financial frictions are particularly severe
for new firms and firms undertaking innovative activities (Hall and Lerner, 2009).2 At the
same time, young and small firms significantly contribute to technological progress and
economic growth (OECD, 2013). Financial constraints restrain the innovation activities
1Investments in knowledge are defined as expenditures on research and development, higher education
and software. See OECD (2007) for further details.
2See, e.g., Aghion et al. (2007), Brown et al. (2009a).
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of these firms and result in an overall decelerated rate of innovation and a slowdown in
economic progress.3
Further, R&D intensive firms additionally face the problem that their created knowledge
exhibits the characteristics of public goods. Once information on inventions is revealed,
the knowledge is non-rival and non-excludable. A sufficient patent protection is necessary
to maintain investment incentives and to overcome problems of underinvestment. In their
internationalization strategy, R&D intensive firms have to consider that patent law is a
territorial concept, i.e., the scope of patent protection is limited to the territory of the
country where the right is granted. The foundation of a foreign affiliate represents a
transaction, whereby sensitive knowledge is transferred outside the firm and intangible
assets are exposed to a high risk of infringement. A lacking or insufficient patent
protection in host countries can distort global investment decisions and prevent profitable
projects. Particularly R&D intensive multinational firms that intensely rely on intangible
assets are expected to be highly affected by these frictions. Distorted investments could
adversely affect a firm’s growth and restrict the technological progress in host countries.
This dissertation attempts to shed more light onto these market imperfections, which are
aggravated by firms’ reliance on intangible assets and are expected to adversely affect
firms’ innovation and internationalization strategy. The first two chapters deal with
frictions in financial markets. Chapter 1 takes a step back and investigates how access to
finance can be precisely measured. A precise measurement is essential to design effective
policy measures in order to foster access to finance. On the basis of these findings, Chapter
2 considers the access to external finance of R&D intensive start-up firms and empirically
investigates whether patents can mitigate financial frictions of these innovative firms. The
third chapter considers frictions in the internationalization strategies of R&D intensive
firms. It empirically investigates, whether a strengthening of national patent law affects
the global investment decision of multinationals and encourages foreign direct investment.
The first chapter is concerned with the empirical methodology of measuring access
to finance. Measuring and identifying financial constraints represents an important
challenge in empirical studies. Due to data limitations, access to finance has often been
3See, e.g., Savignac (2008), Paunov (2012), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), Amore et al. (2013).
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approximated by the usage of finance or by perception-based indicators. However, these
types of measures disregard firm-specific differences in the demand for external finance.
Firms that do not use external finance can either be financially constrained or might have
no demand for external finance. Similarly, firms reporting that they do not face problems
with access to finance may either have sufficient access or may have no financial demand.
Using unique firm-level survey data which provides information on a firm’s demand for
credit, we develop a direct measure of access to credit. This measure takes into account
whether a firm that has credit demand is successful in obtaining access to credit. In the
first part of the analysis, we use our direct measure to estimate the determinants of access
to credit. Thereby, we can separate the determinants affecting credit demand from those
affecting access. In the second part, we estimate the determinants affecting the usage of
credit and the perceived access respectively. A comparison of the identified determinants
with those from the access estimation reveals whether the approximating measures allow
for a precise identification of credit constraints.
We find that the usage of credit is not adequate to identify financially constrained firms,
since the determinants of demand and the determinants of access are not disentangled
in the usage measure. Perception based indicators, however, are found to be surprisingly
precise, even when information on demand is not available. Based on these findings,
recommendations for future survey design for investigating access to finance are drawn.
Our results imply that including questions on the demand for external finance is essential
to identify access to finance. Further, since firms can be discouraged from applying,
information on the application for finance is not sufficient and reasons for why firms have
not applied for external finance should be additionally considered.
We contribute to the literature by evaluating whether the usage of credit is a suitable
approximation for access to credit and whether perception-based indicators provide
precise measurements of credit constraints. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first empirical evaluation of these measures. A precise measure of access to finance is
essential for drawing correct policy recommendations from economic research and to
design efficient policy measures with the aim of fostering access to finance.
3
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The second chapter turns to the financing of R&D intensive start-up firms. It investigates
the role of patents in their external finance and examines whether patents can improve
the access to external financing for innovative start-up firms. Patents have the potential
to reduce information asymmetries between patentees and investors (Long, 2002) and
can also be seen as a type of property rights, since patents are fully transferable as well
as exclusive and binding against third parties (Davies, 2006).
Using detailed firm-level survey data of German start-up firms, we identify a firm’s
financial demand for venture capital and bank financing and investigate whether a firm
that has demand for a particular source of finance is successful in obtaining it. To
measure a firm’s patenting activity and to distinguish high valuable patents, we use
value-weighted patent counts that are based on the direct valuations by the patent
owners. Instrumental-variable estimations take into account the potential endogeneity of
patenting and establish a causal effect of patents.
The analysis reveals two important findings. First, we find strong evidence for its
endogeneity and provide a possible instrumentation strategy for patenting. Ignoring
the endogeneity of patenting can result in highly biased estimates. Second, our results
indicate that patenting significantly increases the probability of using venture capital and
bank financing, especially when the values of patents are considered. However, it is not
clear whether an increase in the usage of external finance can be fully attributed to an
improved access to finance or whether part of the increase is due to an increased financial
demand of patenting firms. Using separate measures for demand and access, we can
clearly identify a demand driven effect of patents. Patenting firms have a significantly
higher demand for external finance, while, after controlling for financial demand, no effect
on access to external finance has been found.
The contribution of the second chapter is primarily methodical. For future research
on the financial role of patents, our findings emphasize the importance of considering
endogeneity issues of patenting and controlling for firm-specific differences in financial
demand. We can show that a large part of the increase in the usage of external finance
can be attributed to a significantly higher financial demand of patenting firms. This
leads to the question, whether the findings in the previous literature on the usage of
4
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external finance can be fully attributed to a signaling effect of patents or whether the
identified effect is driven by a higher financial demand of patenting firms. Further,
most previous studies on the role of patents in financing have not considered issues of
endogeneity.4 Taking into account our results, it is not clear whether previous findings
can be interpreted as causal effects or mere correlations.
The third chapter deals with frictions due to a lack of patent protection and empirically
investigates the role of patent protection in the global investment decisions of German
multinationals. Using a firm-level panel dataset on the universe of German outward
foreign direct investment (FDI), we investigate individual firm-level investment decisions
at the extensive and intensive margin of FDI. At the extensive margin, we explore the
impact of patent protection on the decision where to locate a foreign affiliate. At the
intensive margin, we analyze how the strengthening of patent rights affects the size of the
established affiliates and the ownership share held in the foreign affiliates. To isolate the
effect of patent protection, we exploit variation of patent protection across countries and
time, as well as variation of the dependency on patent protection across sectors and time.
A firm’s dependency on patent protection is approximated by sector-specific measures
of R&D intensity and the perceived effectiveness of patent protection for protecting
innovation. By conditioning on an extensive set of fixed effects, we account for unobserved
firm- and country-specific heterogeneity and capture potential omitted variable bias.
We find that patent protection affects German foreign direct investment in different
ways. Strengthening patent protection positively affects the location decision of German
multinationals. Furthermore, we find significant nonlinear effects in a host country’s
initial legal and economic development. With regard to the intensive margin, we find
some evidence for a positive effect of patent protection. However, the effect is much
weaker than for the location decision. For the ownership shares held in foreign affiliates,
we find that average ownership shares increase significantly after strengthening patent
protection.
The analysis complements and contributes to the previous literature on the relation
between intellectual property right (IPR) protection and FDI in different manners.
4An important exception is the study by Conti et al. (2013).
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It provides the first firm-level evidence on German multinationals. Insights into how
German multinationals are affected by international patent protection are particularly
interesting, since Germany is second in the ranking of FDI outward countries (UNCTAD,
2011). Further, the analysis provides a strong identification strategy that allows for
nonlinear effects of patent protection and considers various sources of omitted variable
bias. Additionally, we take into account host countries’ previous levels of legal and
economic development, which enables us to draw more precise policy recommendations
for reforming countries. Finally, the analysis provides a comprehensive firm-level analysis
of FDI decisions at various levels of FDI, something which has been missing in previous
research.
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Measurement and Determinants of
Access to Credit∗
1.1 Introduction
Access to finance is regarded as a major determinant of economic growth and development
and has been an important policy goal for developing countries.1 During the recent
financial crisis bank lending has decreased often dramatically. The resulting credit
crunches forced firms to cut their investments (e.g., Campello et al., 2010) and had
negative impacts on economic growth. To contain these adverse effects governments took
a variety of measures to improve the access to credit for firms, including the provision
of public guarantees for loans to particular industries (OECD, 2011). In order to answer
the question of how policy measures should be best designed to foster access to finance,
a precise measurement of access to finance is necessary. Due to data limitations, direct
measurements of access to finance are, in many cases, not available and thus indirect
proxies have to be used. Access to finance is often approximated by the usage of finance.
This approach, however, neglects the fact that firms that do not use external finance can
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Christa Hainz.
1E.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998); Beck et al. (2000). For developing countries, there are several
studies that use either policy changes or controlled experiments to estimate the effect of credit constraints
on firm performance (for a survey, see Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). Karlan and Morduch (2009)
provide a comprehensive overview on the topic in the context of development economics.
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either be financially constrained or might have no demand for external finance. The same
is true for perception-based indicators: firms reporting that they do not face problems
with access to finance may either have sufficient access or may have no financial demand.
In the paper we develop a direct measure of access to credit, which takes into account
whether a firm that has credit demand is successful in getting access to credit. For
the first time to our knowledge, this paper then provides an empirical evaluation of
measurements that approximate access to credit. To this end it addresses the following
questions: what are the determinants of access to credit? Are measurements based on the
usage of credit valid approximations for access to credit? Do perception-based indicators
allow for precise identification and prediction of credit constraints?
To answer these questions we use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS), which has been jointly conducted by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. This data set contains detailed
firm-level survey data for 9,655 firms in 27 countries in Europe and Central Asia.
It provides a unique source of financial information on credit financing, which is an
important source of external finance for small- and medium enterprises (SME) in general,
and for firms in developing countries in particular.
In the survey firms were asked not only whether they have a bank loan, but also to
state the reasons why they do not use loans. The answers can be broadly divided into
two categories - either a firm was restricted from access to credit or it did not have any
demand for it. In a first step, we develop a direct measure of access to credit, which
takes into account whether a firm that needs credit is successful in obtaining a loan. By
controlling for demand, we can differentiate between firms that are denied access and
firms that do not need credit. For the purpose of analyzing access to credit only the first
group is relevant. We additionally control for a possible selection bias, as the selection
into credit demand might not be random. This allows us to consistently estimate the
determinants of access to credit. In a second step, we estimate the determinants for the
usage of credit and compare them with the results from the access estimations. Thereby
we can highlight the differences between both measures and evaluate whether information
on the usage of loans is sufficient to identify credit constraints. Finally, we investigate
8
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whether a perception-based indicator is precise enough to identify the same determinants
as a direct measure of access to credit.
Our analysis yields three important results. First, for estimating the determinants of
access to credit, we use a two-stage regression for demand and access, so that we can
separate the determinants influencing demand from those affecting access. With regard
to credit demand, we find a higher demand for domestic firms and firms perceiving
competition as more intense. Small firms as well as foreign- and state-owned firms less
often demand credit. Given that a firm has demand, a significantly higher probability for
access to credit is found for profitable, transparent and foreign-owned firms, while young
and small firms face a higher risk of being credit constrained. With regard to country-level
characteristics, in particular stronger creditor rights are associated with better access
to credit. Second, we estimate the determinants for the usage of credit and compare
the identified determinants with those of the access estimations. Our findings reveal
considerable differences between both measures and suggest that the demand and the
access effect are not disentangled in the usage-approach. We conclude that approximating
access to credit by usage of credit is not adequate to identify credit constraints. Third,
evaluating the perception-based indicators, we find that these measures can predict credit
constraints very precisely, even when information on credit demand is not available.
This paper is related to the literature on access to finance and how it is determined by
firm- and country-specific characteristics. In this literature, a variety of measurements
for access to finance have been used.2 Basically, the financial situation of firms has
been evaluated by using balance-sheet data or survey data. Balance-sheet data provide
information about which sources of finance are actually used and to what extent.
Information from the annual report can indicate that financial constraints exist when
firms cannot fulfill covenants. Furthermore, balance-sheet data have been used to analyze
the sensitivity of investment to cash flows as an indicator of financial constraints (Fazzari
et al., 1988). However, there is a considerable debate about this approach (Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997, 2000). Since reliable balance-sheet data are needed, these measures are
most appropriate for studying large firms. If the research interest concerns SME or firms
2A detailed survey of approaches to measure financial frictions can be found in Gumpert (2012).
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from developing countries or emerging markets, comprehensive data on balance-sheet
information is often not available.
A large strand of the literature on the determinants of access to finance is based on
survey data. Often, approximations based on the usage of finance or perception-based
indicators for access to finance and cost of finance are used. Beck et al. (2006) show
that perceived access is influenced by size, age and ownership of a firm. Brown et al.
(2009b) provide evidence that information sharing among banks improves the perceived
availability and cost of credit and increases the usage of external finance (in terms of
firm debt relative to total assets), particularly for opaque firms and firms located in
countries with a weak institutional environment. With respect to institutions, Safavian
and Sharma (2007) find that the quality of the legal system and its enforcement are
complements, using the usage of loans as dependent variable (as binary variable or as the
share of new investments financed through loans). Giannetti and Ongena (2009) show
that better financial integration in terms of foreign bank lending increases the usage of
credit financing. At the same time, an increased foreign bank presence leads to a higher
growth rate among firms. This indirectly indicates that the demand for external finance
has also been raised. To summarize, it is not always clear whether an overall increase in
the usage of external finance or better perceived access goes along with actually improved
access to finance, when the demand for external finance has not been captured.
A small number of papers, which also use the detailed financial information from the
BEEPS dataset, consider credit demand in investigating access to credit. Muravyev
et al. (2009) explain loan acceptance and control for loan applications in a robustness
check, showing that female owners are less likely to obtain loans than male owners. The
analysis by Brown et al. (2011) provides a comprehensive examination of the firm and
country characteristics that influence whether a firm needs a loan, applies for it and is
successful with its application. Popov and Udell (2012) show that the financial health of
banks influences the loan supply for firms.
We contribute to the literature by evaluating whether the usage of credit is a suitable
approximation for access to credit and whether perception-based indicators provide a
precise measurement of credit constraints. A precise measure of access to finance is
10
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essential for subsequent research on the impact of financial constraints on economic
outcomes or firm decisions. For instance, financial constraints can affect firm growth
and performance (e.g., Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008) and innovative activities
(e.g., Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013) as well as firm decisions with regard to
internationalization (e.g., Berman and Héricourt, 2010; Manova, 2013). Consequently,
a precise identification of financially constrained firms is essential to draw policy
recommendations and to design efficient policy measures to foster the access to finance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data and the econometric
specification. The results of the empirical analysis on the determinants of access to
credit are summarized in Section 1.3.1. The evaluation of the usage and perception-based
measures are presented in the Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3. Section 1.4 presents the sensitivity
analysis. This is followed by some conclusions and recommendations for future survey
design in Section 1.5.
1.2 Data and Methodology
1.2.1 Data
We use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) collected
jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The BEEPS assesses the environment for private enterprises and business development.
The survey conducted in March and April 2005 entails the most detailed information on
debt financing among all waves and thereby enables us to develop a direct measure of
access to credit.3 It covers 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Depending
on the size of the country, between 200 and 900 firms were interviewed. We exclude data
3Only the BEEPS 2005 wave provides information on the usage of credit and credit applications that
both refer to the same time period. In the BEEPS 2009 wave, information on the application for loans
refers to the fiscal year 2007, while the usage information refers to past loans without time restrictions.
Both pieces of information are necessary to construct a measure of access to credit and should cover
the same time period. The World Bank Environment Survey (WBES), which covers more developing
countries and is the equivalent survey to BEEPS, unfortunately also does not make it possible to study
this question, since information on credit need and information on the usage of credit do not refer to the
same period of time and therefore cannot be matched precisely.
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from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Serbia as information on institutional
characteristics is missing. We also leave out Turkey to focus on transition countries. So
we ultimately analyze 5,762 firms in 23 countries, 14 countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and
nine countries from the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine).
Stratified random sampling ensures that the samples are representative in each country.
Firms from both manufacturing and service sectors were included, whereby the sectoral
composition in the sample is determined by the relative contribution of manufacturing
and service sectors to domestic GDP. Firms that operate in sectors subject to government
price regulation and prudential supervision (e.g., banking, electric power, rail transport,
water and waste) were not included in the sample (see EBRD, 2005a).
The questionnaire contains general firm characteristics and a detailed section on the
financing of the firm. Information on the most recent loan is available and when loans
are not used within a firm, additional information on the reasons are provided. In our
sample, 47 percent of all firms currently have a loan. Among firms that do not use loans,
about five percent were rejected while 93 percent did not apply for a loan. In two percent
of all cases credit applications were still pending. It is unclear whether these firms will
obtain access to loans, so we do not include them in our analysis. Additionally, firms
cite multiple reasons why they did not apply for a loan. The answers can be broadly
divided into two categories. First, some firms were discouraged from credit applications
for reasons such as too high burdens in the application procedure, overly strict collateral
requirements, excessively high interest rates or informal payments that have to be made
to obtain a loan. Second, a firm may not have applied for a loan because it did not
need one. In short, 36 percent of the non-applicants were discouraged from a credit
application, while the major proportion of 64 percent had no need for bank financing.
This differentiation is essential for identifying access to credit in the following analysis.
Table 1.1 provides the descriptive statistics for these survey responses.
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Table 1.1: Identifying access to loans
Does the firm have a loan? Freq. Percent
Yes 2,695 46.77
No 3,067 53.23
Total 5,762 100
If the firm does not have a loan, what was the reason? Freq. Percent
Firm did not apply for a loan 2,853 93.02
Application was turned down 141 4.60
Application for the loan is still pending 73 2.38
Total 3,067 100
If the firm did not apply, what were the main reasons?
(multiple answers) Freq. Percent
Does not need a loan 1,830 46.27
Application procedure too burdensome 529 13.38
Collateral requirements too strict 564 14.26
Interest rates too high 786 19.87
Informal payments necessary to get bank loans 80 2.02
Did not think it would be approved 104 2.63
Others 62 1.57
Total 4,416 100
If the firm did not apply, what were the main reasons?
(consolidated answers) Freq. Percent
No need (at least one answer is "does not need a loan") 1,830 64.14
Discouraged (none of the answers is "does not need a loan") 1,023 35.86
Total 2,853 100
1.2.2 Measuring Access to Credit
The detailed questionnaire on the financing of firms enables us to construct a
direct measure of access to credit and to evaluate whether the usage of credit and
perception-based indicators are suitable approximations for access to credit. For
investigating access to credit it is essential to consider only firms that have demand
for credit. To identify firms with credit demand, we make use of the above mentioned
differentiation between rejected and discouraged firms and firms with no need for credit.
We classify the following three groups as having demand for credit:
a. firms that are using loans,
b. firms that have applied for a loan, but were rejected and
c. firms that were discouraged from applying for credit.
A firm is classified as discouraged when it has not applied for a credit purely because it
was discouraged from doing so, and not because it did not require credit. I.e., a firm is
13
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Table 1.2: Coding of the dependent variables
Categories Usage Demand Access Freq. Percent
Firm has a loan 1 1 1 2,695 47.37
No loan, because application turned down 0 1 0 141 2.48
No loan, because discouraged from applying 0 1 0 1,023 17.98
No loan, because no need 0 0 - 1,830 32.17
classified as discouraged if none of the multiple answers is "no need". Accordingly, the
binary variable demand equals 1 for all three groups (a-c). It equals 0 if the firm does
not have a loan because it had no need for credit and therefore did not apply for one.
Subsequently, to analyze access to credit we consider only firms with credit demand.
Firms that demand credit and have a loan are classified as having access to credit (a),
while firms with credit demand that do not have a loan are classified as being credit
constrained (b, c). The latter group comprises discouraged firms and firms that applied
for a loan, but were rejected. Hereby, we follow the literature on this topic and group
firms that were rejected together with firms that were discouraged from applying (see, e.g.,
Popov and Udell (2012) for definitions for credit constraints of firms; Cox and Jappelli
(1993) and Duca and Rosenthal (1993) for credit constraints of households). The variable
access equals 1 if a firm has a loan and zero if a firm does not have a loan, although it
does have credit demand.
As for the usage of credit, we construct the variable usage, which equals 1 if a firm has a
loan and zero otherwise. This measure is equivalent to former studies that approximate
access to credit by the usage of credit. Among firms without loans, the usage measure does
not differentiate between credit constrained firms (including rejected and discouraged
firms) and firms that actually have no demand for credit. Table 1.2 summarizes the
distribution of firms among these groups and further clarifies the difference between the
access and the usage measure.
For the perception-based indicator firms were asked to evaluate whether access to
financing in general, i.e., the financing available from banks, was problematic in terms
of the operation and growth of their business. The variable perceived access varies from
1 “major obstacle” to 4 “no obstacle”, such that a higher value signals a better access
to finance. The distribution of perceived access among different groups is presented in
14
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Table 1.3: Distribution of perceived access among financial categories
Demand No Demand Mean Diff.
Perceived Access 2.516 3.135 -0.619***
Access No Access Mean Diff.
Perceived Access 2.670 2.516 0.510***
Usage No Usage Mean Diff.
Perceived Access 2.670 2.756 -0.086***
Notes: The table reports differences in means for perceived access for
the different categories of demand, access and usage. The results of a
two-sample t-test with equal variances are provided in the last column.
***, **, * denote that the difference in means is statistically significant
from zero at a 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level.
Table 1.3. In our sample, the average perception is 2.715, whereby a higher value indicates
better access to credit. It is noticeable that the perception of access is significantly better
among firms without credit demand (3.135) than for firms with demand (2.516). This
strengthens our assumption that firms without credit demand state that they experience
no obstacle regarding access to credit. Furthermore, firms that do not use loans have a
significantly better perception than firms that have access to loans (2.756 versus 2.670),
which indicates that firms without a loan are not necessarily credit constrained.
1.2.3 Regression Strategy
To investigate the determinants of access to credit, we first estimate probit regressions
that investigate whether a firm with credit demand is successful in getting access to
credit. Therefore, we restrict the sample to firms that have credit demand (groups a-c)
and estimate the following probit model
accessi = φ(α0 + α1age 0-7 i + α2age 14+i + α3foreigni + α4state-ownedi (1.1)
+ α5privatizedi + α6smalli + α7transparencyi
+ α8profitsi + α9capacityi + ηs + λc)
15
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where φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. ηs and λc denote
sector and country fixed effects. The included explanatory variables are explained in
Section 1.2.4.
Second, since the selection into the demand group might not be random and unmeasured
determinants could jointly influence a firm’s demand for a loan and a firm’s probability of
getting access to credit. If this unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the covariates
in the access estimation, the estimations suffer from an omitted variable bias. Therefore,
we additionally control for potential selection bias by estimating a bivariate selection
model that takes into account interdependencies between the selection and the outcome
stage. We use a probit model with sample selection based on Heckman (1979), which
implies binary outcomes for both stages. Under the assumption of a bivariate normal
and independent error distribution, maximum likelihood estimation provides consistent
estimators.4 We estimate
Prob(access = 1 | demand = 1, x) = 1Φ(xγ)
∫ ∞
−xγ
Φ
[
x1β + ρω
(1− ρ2)1/2
]
∗ φ(ω)dω (1.2)
with
access = 1[x1β +  > 0] (1.3)
= 1[β0 + β1age 0-7 i + β2age 14+i + β3foreigni + β4state-ownedi
+ β5privatizedi + β6smalli + β7transparencyi + β8profitsi
+ β9capacityi + ηs + λc + i > 0]
demand = 1[xγ + ω > 0] (1.4)
= 1[γ0 + γ1age 0-7 i + γ2age 14+i + γ3foreigni + γ4state-ownedi
+ γ5privatizedi + γ6smalli + γ7transparencyi + γ8profitsi
+ γ9capacityi + γ9perceived competitioni + γ10investmenti
+ ηs + λc + ωi > 0]
4A detailed derivation of the likelihood function for the probit model with sample selection can be
found in Wooldridge (2002).
16
Measurement and Determinants of Access to Credit
where access is the outcome and demand the selection equation. ρ is the correlation
between  and ω.5
For a robust identification additional exclusion restrictions are necessary, i.e., variables
that generate nontrivial variation in the selection variable, but do not directly affect
the outcome variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In our regression, we include a
firm’s individual perception of competition as exclusion restriction. After controlling for
general sector-specific fixed effects, this measure from a firm’s individual perception has
the advantage of capturing firm-specific competition. Thereby (unobserved) variation of
firms within the same sector is considered.6
The competitive environment should influence a firm’s credit demand. Faced with greater
competition, firms may invest more often in order to improve their position relative to
other competitors and therefore they may need external finance more often. Alternatively,
a too intense competition could also reduce the attractiveness of new investments and
result in a lower credit demand. In both cases, the individual competitive environment
should be relevant for a firm’s credit demand. Banks, however, base their decision to grant
a loan mainly on hard information, and specifically on figures that are observable in the
firm’s balance sheet. For the assessment of the competitive environment, banks mainly
use industry ratings that disregard region- and firm-specific circumstances.7 Thus, after
controlling for fixed differences on sector (and country) level, additional variation from
the individual perception of competition should not have a direct impact on a bank’s
decision to grant a loan.
To measure the competitive environment, firms were asked what would happen if they
raised the prices of their main product line or main line of services by ten percent in the
domestic market. The variable perceived competition takes the value 1 if they expected
5If the assumption of bivariate normal error distribution is not fulfilled, the estimator would be
biased. In the sensitivity analysis in 1.4.2 we therefore present a linear Heckman two-step estimation
that relies on the weaker distributional assumption of univariate normality. Since the results are very
similar, we conclude that the assumption of bivariate normal error distribution is unproblematic and
decide to use the more efficient maximum likelihood estimator in the baseline regressions.
6E.g., Tang (2006) and Schmiele (2012) use similar individual perception-based measures to explain
why firms exhibit different levels of innovation activities within the same product market.
7This assumption is confirmed in the guide of a development bank compiled for firms applying for
loans at commercial banks. It gives firms advice on how to apply and provides explanations for bank
behavior (LfA, 2009).
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customers to continue to buy the same quantities, 2 if they were predicted to buy a
slightly reduced quantity, 3 if they were expected to buy a much lower quantity, and
lastly 4 if many buyers were forecasted to switch and buy from the competitor instead.
Additionally, we include the dummy variable investment in the demand equation to
directly measure a firm’s previous investments. It equals 1 if the firm has acquired a new
production technology within the last 36 months. Consequently, perceived competition
and investment should provide good demand shifters (see Popov and Udell (2012) for a
similar rationale). Since we cannot test the validity of the exclusion restriction, we assess
the stability of the results and provide alternative instrumentation strategies in Section
1.4.1. The results do not change.
To evaluate whether the measures based on the usage of credit and on perception-based
indicators identify the same determinants of credit constraints, we re-estimate equation
(1) for the dependent variable usage (probit regression) and the perception-based
indicator perceived access (OLS regression), respectively.8
1.2.4 Explanatory Variables
The following section describes the explanatory variables of all specifications.
Firm-Level Explanatory Variables Judging by the policy debate and the existing
evidence, there are several important firm-specific characteristics that may influence
access to credit (see, e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2011). These include the
size, age and ownership of the firm. With respect to size, different effects interfere. On
the one hand, the banks’ costs for conducting a credit evaluation do not vary a lot with the
amount of the loan. Thus, smaller loans are less profitable for banks, which may therefore
be reluctant to lend to smaller firms. On the other hand, there is a diversification effect
by granting many small loans. The dummy variable small controls for the size of a firm,
it equals 1 if the number of employees is less than 50.
8The perceived access variable exhibits four different categories, so that we also have estimated
ordered probit regressions. The results are very similar. For reasons of interpretability, we report the
OLS results.
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For newly founded firms the information asymmetries faced by a creditor are most severe.
Older firms already have a track record and can (ideally) show that they have always
repaid on time. At the same time, the age of a firm should also influence credit demand.
Depending on the stage of development of a firm, financial needs differ and so do the
alternative sources of finance available. To measure the effect of age, we use dummy
variables to take account of young firms (0 - 7 years), transition firms (8-13 years) and
pre-transition firms (14 years or more) that were established before 1991.
In transition countries, the ownership structure has some special features. After the
demise of the socialist system all firms were basically state-owned. Since then many of
the firms have been privatized with the aim of rendering them more efficient. From this
point of view, privatized firms should be better debtors. However, if state-owned firms
have a soft budget constraint, they will not fail and therefore the bank does not face a risk
financing them. The effect of ownership structure is captured with the dummy variables
private, privatized and state-owned. Furthermore, we control for the nationality of a firm
and include the dummy variable foreign, which equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a
foreign company.
Firms can try to reduce the information asymmetries faced by the investors by becoming
more transparent, for instance, through reporting their balance-sheets according to
international accounting standards and having them audited by a renowned auditing
company. The variable transparency takes the value 0 if a firm neither uses international
accounting standards nor external audits; it takes the value 1 if at least one of them is
used and the value 2 if both are used.9
Moreover, the chance of being granted a loan depends on the firm’s default risk. We
capture this risk by the profits of a firm. The dummy variable profits equals 1 if the
firm realized positive profits in 2003 and zero otherwise. The utilization capacity should
indicate the order situation and further approximate a firm’s capability. The variable
9This measure is based on Brown et al. (2009b). The degree of transparency is determined by firms’
choices within regulatory limits. However, in the following analysis it is treated as an exogenous variable,
referring to robustness checks provided by Brown et al. (2009b). Using the same measure of transparency,
they control for potential endogeneity using instrumental variables estimations and show that analysis
of cost and usage of credit using BEEPS data do not change.
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capacity measures the degree of output in comparison with the maximum possible output
(in percentage).
The sector in which a firm operates plays an important role. Depending on the nature
of the firm’s business, the need for financing might differ substantially. For instance, the
size of investments is much higher in manufacturing than in retail. Thus, the demand
for credit might strongly depend on the firm’s sector. However, we expect that access
to loans depends on firm-specific, rather than on sector-specific factors. We control for
differences in sector characteristics by using dummy variables that are equal to 1 if over 50
percent of a firm’s sales comes from this sector.10 The sectors are mining and quarrying
(sector 1), construction (sector 2), manufacturing (sector 3), wholesale, retail and repairs
(sector 4), real-estate, renting and business services (sector 5), hotels and restaurants
(sector 6) and others (sector 7). Table 1.4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the
firm-level explanatory variables.
Country-Level Explanatory Variables To gain further insights into macroeconomic
determinants, we additionally estimate all specifications with country-level explanatory
variables that are expected to influence access to credit (instead of country dummies λc).
The legal framework is of particular importance, since it shapes the credit contracts that
can potentially be designed through two channels. The first channel is the protection of
creditor rights as codified in the law. The better creditor rights are protected, the more
likely banks are willing to provide loans (La Porta et al., 1998). The second channel is
how well the protection of creditor rights is indeed enforced (Pistor et al., 2000). We
capture the first channel through an index of creditor rights constructed by the World
Bank. It measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of
borrowers and lenders and ranges between 1 and 10. A higher score facilitates lending and
therefore leads to better access to credit. For the second channel, we use the effectiveness
of legal institutions measured by the days it takes to enforce a contract (enforcement).
10The majority of the firms operate in a single sector. We additionally construct a sector measure
that takes into account where the maximum proportion of sales comes from, which does not change the
results.
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Credit markets are subject to substantial problems of asymmetric information, which are
most severe in emerging markets. Information sharing devices such as credit registries are
an important mechanism for reducing information asymmetries by providing information
on, for instance, whether a firm has defaulted on a loan previously. Thus, their existence
should make access easier, particularly for more opaque firms.11 Here we use an index
developed by Brown et al. (2009b). This index measures the presence and structure of
public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The value ranges from 1 to 5, the
more detailed the information provided is and the longer the registry has existed, the
higher the scale.
The effect of foreign bank presence on access to credit is controversial. On the one hand,
foreign banks bring expertise and capital into the host market, which can improve access
to credit (particularly for larger firms, as Giannetti and Ongena (2009) show). On the
other hand, it is argued that foreign banks might focus on particularly lucrative projects,
which are easily identifiable because they are transparent. As a result, access to credit
might become more difficult (Detragiache et al., 2006 and Gormley, 2010). However,
foreign bank entry also affects the behavior of domestic banks; they may start lending
to more opaque firms and thereby benefit all firms (Dell’ Arricia and Marquez, 2004,
Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). We capture the presence of foreign banks by the market
share of foreign-owned banks.
Moreover, we use the income level measured by the log of the GDP per capita (logGDPpc)
and inflation as explanatory variables and include a measure of bank concentration. Table
1.5 summarizes the country-level explanatory variables. For all country-level variables
we use average values for the years 2001-2003, with the exception of creditor rights and
enforcement (2005 values, earlier values are not available). The definitions and data
sources of all explanatory variables can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
11There is a rich body of theoretical literature on the effects of information sharing on the behavior
of borrowers and ultimately on the credit market (for a summary, see Brown et al., 2009b). Information
sharing does not have positive effects on access to credit in all models. The effects depend crucially on
the incentive problem specified in the model.
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1.2.5 Descriptive Statistics
The access measure considers only firms with credit demand and indicates whether a
firm that has demand is successful in obtaining credit. In estimating access to credit,
self-selection into demand might be present. Comparing differences in average firm
characteristics between firms with and without credit demand can provide a first hint
as to selection. A two-sample t-test for continuous variables (and a proportion test
for binary variables) shows that the differences in means are significantly different from
zero for most firm characteristics (Table 1.6, Panel A). We find that both groups differ
significantly in ownership, size and transparency. Firms with credit demand are less
often foreign- and state-owned, but more often privately-owned or privatized. Among
firms with credit demand, 68 percent are small compared to 73 percent in the no-demand
group. The comparison in means provides initial evidence that the selection into the
demand group might not be random.
In contrast to the access measure, the usage measure does not take into account differences
in firm-specific credit demand. Therefore, among firms that do not use loans no
differentiation is made between firms that have credit demand (and are considered to
be credit constrained) and firms without credit demand (unconstrained). However, these
types of firms may differ systematically and aggregating them into one group might
not make it possible to draw conclusions regarding credit constraints. To evaluate the
degree of heterogeneity, we compare both groups with regard to differences in average firm
characteristics (Table 1.6, Panel B). For the subsample of firms that do not use loans, the
majority has no demand for credit (64 percent), while 36 percent are credit constrained.
Firms that experience credit constraints (demand=1) are significantly more often young
firms and less often foreign or state-owned. Firms without demand are, on average,
more transparent and more often profitable than credit constrained firms. In short,
the heterogeneity among firms without loans is large and the considerable fraction of
firms with no credit demand indicates that the usage approach might provide misleading
conclusions on credit constraints.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity of firms with and without demand for loans
Panel A: All firms
Demand No Demand Mean Diff.
Age (in years) 15.656 15.125 0.531
Age 0-7 0.302 0.301 0.001
Age 8-13 0.390 0.408 -0.018
Age 14+ 0.308 0.291 0.017
Foreign 0.083 0.114 -0.032***
State-owned 0.063 0.107 -0.043***
Private 0.854 0.779 0.075***
Privatized 0.154 0.115 0.039***
Small 0.680 0.731 -0.051***
Transparancy 0.652 0.599 0.053***
Profits 0.846 0.859 -0.013
Capacity 81.325 85.308 -3.983***
Panel B: Subsample of firms that do not use loans
Demand No Demand Mean Diff.
(constrained) (unconstrained)
Age (in years) 13.607 15.125 -1.517**
Age 0-7 0.372 0.301 0.071***
Age 8-13 0.365 0.408 -0.043**
Age 14+ 0.263 0.291 -0.028*
Foreign 0.051 0.114 -0.064***
State-owned 0.076 0.107 -0.031***
Private 0.874 0.779 0.094***
Privatized 0.874 0.779 0.095***
Small 0.850 0.731 0.119***
Transparancy 0.420 0.599 -0.179***
Profits 0.790 0.859 -0.069***
Capacity 80.454 85.308 -4.855***
Notes: Panel A reports differences in means of firm characteristics for
firms with and without demand for the whole sample, Panel B for the
subsample of firms that do not use loans (usage=0). For continuous
variables the results of a two-sample t-test with equal variances and
for binary variables the results from a two-sample proportion test are
provided in the last column. ***, **, * denote that the difference in
means is statistically significant from zero at a 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level.
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1.3 Results
The aim of our study is to investigate whether measures based on the usage of credit
or on perception-based indicators, that both do not consider firm-specific differences in
demand, are suitable proxies for access to credit when information on demand is not
available. Therefore, we first estimate the determinants of access to credit in Section
1.3.1. Second, we estimate the determinants affecting the usage of credit (Section 1.3.2)
and the perceived access (Section 1.3.3) and compare the findings with those in the access
estimations. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered on country-level.12
1.3.1 Access to Credit
Table 1.7 summarizes the estimation results for access to credit. The first two columns
present the marginal effects evaluated at mean from the basic probit estimations. The
first specification controls for country fixed effects by including country dummies. The
second specification replaces the country dummies with explanatory variables at the
country level. We find that small firms and state-owned firms are less likely to get access
to credit, while transparent and profitable firms are more likely to have access. Young
firms (0-7 years) have a higher probability of facing restricted access in comparison to
established firms (8-13 years), while firms that were founded before transition (14+ years)
do not differ in their access to credit. With respect to sector dummies, after controlling
for firm-level determinants, no sector-specific differences can be found. The results for
the firm-specific effects are robust and do not change when country-specific variables are
added. We find that stronger creditor rights are associated with a better access to credit.
Columns 3a to 4b present the probit estimations with sample selection. For both
specifications the Wald test of independent equations rejects the null hypothesis of
uncorrelated error terms at a one percent significance level, such that the selection into
credit demand is not random. In the selection equation (Column 3a), we find that
small firms have a 6 percentage points lower probability of demanding a loan. This
suggests that small firms might use internal financing sources more often or invest less
12Different levels of clustering are presented in the sensitivity analysis in Section 1.4.3.
26
Measurement and Determinants of Access to Credit
Table 1.7: Access to credit
Probit Probit with Selection
Access Access Demand Access Demand Access
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Age 0-7 -0.040** -0.042** 0.031 -0.035*** 0.028 -0.035***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
Age 14+ -0.029 -0.029 0.007 -0.022 0.018 -0.023
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Foreign 0.019 0.015 -0.125*** 0.046* -0.128*** 0.041*
(0.037) (0.034) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
State-owned -0.150** -0.154** -0.163*** -0.051 -0.173*** -0.054
(0.068) (0.067) (0.037) (0.044) (0.037) (0.046)
Privatized 0.009 0.037 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.025
(0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
Small -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.063*** -0.136*** -0.056*** -0.132***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Transparency 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.022** 0.066*** 0.029** 0.066***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Profits 0.154*** 0.136*** -0.020 0.118*** -0.033 0.106***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
Capacity 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001** -0.002*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sector 2 0.056 0.043 -0.155** 0.062 -0.142** 0.050
(0.084) (0.088) (0.064) (0.058) (0.063) (0.060)
Sector 3 0.066 0.041 -0.122** 0.064 -0.126** 0.047
(0.087) (0.094) (0.059) (0.062) (0.057) (0.065)
Sector 4 0.067 0.064 -0.190*** 0.079 -0.177*** 0.073
(0.073) (0.074) (0.061) (0.051) (0.059) (0.051)
Sector 5 0.004 0.016 -0.295*** 0.063 -0.277*** 0.068
(0.086) (0.085) (0.073) (0.055) (0.071) (0.052)
Sector 6 0.062 0.074 -0.315*** 0.098** -0.301*** 0.102**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.055) (0.043) (0.053) (0.042)
Sector 7 0.011 0.008 -0.198*** 0.044 -0.184*** 0.039
(0.083) (0.085) (0.069) (0.057) (0.067) (0.057)
Log(GDPpc) -0.025 -0.028 -0.011
(0.038) (0.027) (0.022)
Inflation 0.001 0.003** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Banks 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Creditor Rights 0.017* 0.004 0.011*
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Information Sharing 0.014 0.010 0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006)
Enforcement 0.092 0.018 0.060
(0.081) (0.054) (0.044)
Bank Concentration -0.158 -0.054 -0.104
(0.161) (0.115) (0.091)
Investment 0.055*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.017)
Perceived Competition 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.008)
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.132 0.102
Number of Observations 3859 3859 5689 5689
ρ -0.784*** -0.803***
Notes: The table presents marginal effects evaluated at the mean from the basic regressions for
access to loans. In the probit regressions with sample selection (columns 3-4) the dependent variable
in the outcome regression is access to loans, while demand for loans is the dependent variable in the
selection equation. Standard errors are clustered on country-level and are reported in parenthesis.
Sector coding: 1 mining and quarrying, 2 construction, 3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale, retail and
repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services, 6 hotel and restaurants, 7 others. The left
out category for age is age 8-13 (firms founded during transition), for nationality privately-owned
firms and mining and quarrying for sectors. ρ is the correlation between the error terms. ***, **,
* denote that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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than large firms. Capacity, which approximates how successfully a firm attracts external
orders, is significantly negative, indicating that more successful firms less often rely on
debt financing. Foreign-owned firms have a 13 percentage point lower probability of
demanding a loan. An explanation could be that foreign-owned companies have access to
the internal capital markets of global holding companies and therefore rely less intensely
on the host country’s credit markets. Since we simultaneously control for profitability,
we should be able to separate this effect from the second possible channel, namely that
foreign investors acquire the more profitable firms. Additionally, state-owned firms are
significantly less likely to demand credit than privately-owned firms. Our instruments
investment and perceived competition are found to be relevant for credit demand. Firms
that have invested in a new production technology and those facing more competition
are more likely to demand credit.
After controlling for firm-level explanatory variables, sector-specific differences in
credit demand are still present. Compared to firms in the base sector mining and
quarrying, firms in all other sectors are less likely to have demand for credit. When
including explanatory variables at the country-level, the firm-level results remain mostly
unchanged, although we find only inflation to have a significant effect. Firms that are
located in countries with a higher inflation rate have, on average, a higher demand for
credit financing.
In the outcome equations (Columns 3b and 4b) the results show some important
differences when compared to the probit estimations. In contrast to the basic probit
regressions, foreign-owned companies have significantly better access to credit after
controlling for selection into credit demand. Due to their lower demand, the better access
enjoyed by foreign-owned firms is not identified in the basic probit regressions since both
effects run in different directions and might cancel out. The same pattern can be observed
for capacity. After controlling for credit demand, firms with a higher capacity utilization
have better access to credit (which is in line with the interpretation of capacity utilization
as a proxy for a firm’s capability). Regarding state-owned companies, the restricted access
identified in the probit regressions becomes insignificant when controlling for the lower
demand of state-owned companies. Similar to the basic probit regression, better creditor
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rights are associated with significantly better access to credit when controlling for the
selection into demand.
1.3.2 Usage of Credit
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.8 present the estimation results for the usage of loans. For
a better comparability the results from the access estimations are replicated in Columns
3 and 4. The estimated marginal effects differ substantially from those estimated for the
access to credit. In contrast to the findings obtained in the estimations for access to credit,
in terms of age we find no credit constraints of young companies. Here, the higher demand
and the poorer access to credit enjoyed by young companies are not disentangled and
the resulting coefficient is not significant. Foreign-owned companies have a significantly
lower usage of credit. Interpreting a lower usage of credit in terms of credit constraints
would be misleading. In the access estimations, foreign-owned companies are found to
have a lower demand for credit, but conditional on demand they have a better access to
credit. This is also similar for state-owned firms, which have a significantly lower usage
due to lower demand, although they have no worse access to credit compared to private
firms.
Analogously misleading interpretations would also be drawn for sector-specific effects.
In the usage estimations, we observe that some sectors have a significantly lower usage
of credits. This, however, is not due to sector-specific credit constraints, but can be
explained by differences in demand. This finding suggests that sector-specific programs
to improve access, such as public guarantees for loans to particular industries, would not
reach the really financially constrained firms and therefore may be inefficient.
In terms of size, transparency and profitability, we find significant marginal effects with
the same sign as in the access approach. However, differences occur in the magnitude
of the estimated marginal effects. For small firms both approaches identify a higher
probability of being financially constrained. In the access equation the probability of
being financially constrained rises by 13.6 percent if a firm is small, compared to 20.6
percent in the usage equation. The usage approach overestimates the restricted access of
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Table 1.8: Usage of credit
Usage of Loans Access to Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0-7 -0.013 -0.016 -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 14+ -0.012 -0.007 -0.022 -0.023
(0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
Foreign -0.096*** -0.098*** 0.046* 0.041*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
State-owned -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.051 -0.054
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
Privatized 0.003 0.031 0.009 0.025
(0.022) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020)
Small -0.206*** -0.191*** -0.136*** -0.132***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018)
Transparency 0.082*** 0.092*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
Profits 0.096*** 0.075*** 0.118*** 0.106***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022)
Capacity -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Sector 2 -0.034 -0.035 0.062 0.050
(0.077) (0.077) (0.058) (0.060)
Sector 3 -0.016 -0.033 0.064 0.047
(0.083) (0.088) (0.062) (0.065)
Sector 4 -0.058 -0.052 0.079 0.073
(0.072) (0.073) (0.051) (0.051)
Sector 5 -0.170** -0.157** 0.063 0.068
(0.069) (0.070) (0.055) (0.052)
Sector 6 -0.149** -0.139* 0.098** 0.102**
(0.073) (0.072) (0.043) (0.042)
Sector 7 -0.098 -0.091 0.044 0.039
(0.074) (0.074) (0.057) (0.057)
Log(GDPpc) -0.036 -0.011
(0.041) (0.022)
Inflation 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Foreign Banks 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Creditor Rights 0.015* 0.011*
(0.009) (0.006)
Information Sharing 0.017 0.008
(0.014) (0.006)
Enforcement 0.073 0.060
(0.089) (0.044)
Bank Concentration -0.149 -0.104
(0.171) (0.091)
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.086 0.060
Number of Observations 5689 5689 5689 5689
ρ -0.784*** -0.803***
Notes: The table presents the marginal effects evaluated at the mean from
the probit regressions of usage of loans (column 1-2). Columns 3-4 replicate
the marginal effects from the outcome equations of the probit regressions
with sample selection for access to loans from Table 1.7. Standard errors are
clustered on country-level and are reported in parenthesis. Sector coding: 1
mining and quarrying, 2 construction, 3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale, retail and
repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services, 6 hotel and restaurants,
7 others. The left out category for age is age 8-13 (firms founded during
transition), for nationality privately-owned firms and mining and quarrying
for sectors. ρ is the correlation between the error terms. ***, **, * denote that
the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10
level.
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small firms, since it does not take into account their lower credit demand. With respect
to transparency and profits, where we have found less strong demand effects, the usage
approach obtains very similar results.
For the country-level variables we find very similar results. Better creditor rights, which
were found to have a positive effect on the access to credit, do also significantly increase
the usage of credits.
A graphical comparison of access and usage illustrates how systematic the underlying
differences between both approaches are. In the estimation results, the firm-level
explanatory variables for foreign ownership and age were found to differ considerably
between the usage and the access regressions. Both variables are additionally available
as continuous variables and allow separately nonparametric locally weighted regressions
for the dependent variables demand, access and usage (see Figure 1.1). We find a concave
relationship between age and the usage of credits. In terms of access to credit a positive
relationship with a strongly increasing access to credit for older firms is found, while the
demand for credit decreases with firm age. The concave relationship of usage captures
the decreasing credit demand of older firms and shows that access and demand effects
are not disentangled in the usage approach. A similar pattern can be observed for
foreign ownership. While the demand for credit decreases with the share of foreign
investors, access to credit increases. The usage of credits reflects both - the access and
the demand effect. It increases in foreign ownership until a share of 50 percent is reached
and subsequently decreases.
To summarize, the usage measure is found to be an imprecise approximation for access to
credit. Firm-specific differences in credit demand are not captured in the usage measure.
As a result, the demand and access effect interfere and firm-specific determinants of credit
constraints are not properly identified.
1.3.3 Perception-based Indicator
Table 1.9 presents the regression results for the perception-based indicator. The
determinants of the perceived access largely coincide with the identified determinants
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of access to credit (Section 1.3.1). For size, transparency and profits, we find highly
significant effects similar to the access approach: larger, more transparent and profitable
firms have better access to credit. The credit constraints of young companies are also
identified, however the effect is not significant in all specifications. In contrast to
the usage approach, the better access to credit of foreign owned firms and successful
firms in terms of the capacity utilization is identified - without information on credit
demand. Furthermore, we find that firms in countries with higher GDP per capita
have a significantly better perception of access to credit, while higher inflation rates are
associated with a worse perceived access to credit. Interestingly, while the enforcement
of contracts has no significant effect on access to credit, it influences the perception of
access and a weaker enforcement (more days to resolve a dispute) is associated with worse
perceived access to credit.
We use the comprehensive information on credit demand to further analyze whether
the identified determinants of the perceived access differ with a firm’s credit demand.
Figure 1.1: Locally weighted regressions
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Table 1.9: Perceived access to finance
All Firms Firms with Demand Firms without Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0-7 -0.055 -0.107** -0.053 -0.111** -0.041 -0.061
(0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047)
Age 14+ -0.061 -0.042 -0.123 -0.096* 0.051 0.097*
(0.058) (0.037) (0.076) (0.054) (0.056) (0.052)
Foreign 0.281*** 0.277*** 0.254*** 0.261*** 0.149 0.158
(0.060) (0.062) (0.080) (0.079) (0.093) (0.097)
State-owned 0.085 0.058 -0.055 -0.069 0.025 0.002
(0.078) (0.071) (0.072) (0.075) (0.121) (0.111)
Privatized 0.117* 0.096 0.138 0.115 0.057 0.057
(0.068) (0.066) (0.082) (0.088) (0.076) (0.068)
Small -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.226*** -0.241*** -0.193** -0.152**
(0.040) (0.047) (0.054) (0.061) (0.069) (0.071)
Transparency 0.066** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.049 0.092**
(0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039)
Profits 0.164** 0.134* 0.195** 0.152* 0.078 0.048
(0.066) (0.067) (0.074) (0.079) (0.089) (0.090)
Capacity 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Sector 2 -0.126 -0.148 -0.217 -0.247 -0.118 -0.159
(0.263) (0.250) (0.305) (0.285) (0.234) (0.244)
Sector 3 -0.121 -0.183 -0.132 -0.207 -0.259 -0.364
(0.245) (0.232) (0.297) (0.277) (0.190) (0.219)
Sector 4 -0.003 0.004 -0.054 -0.050 -0.184 -0.200
(0.243) (0.225) (0.277) (0.254) (0.202) (0.212)
Sector 5 0.129 0.153 0.013 0.067 -0.092 -0.132
(0.235) (0.214) (0.280) (0.257) (0.215) (0.221)
Sector 6 0.131 0.150 0.021 0.067 -0.153 -0.183
(0.245) (0.222) (0.292) (0.269) (0.211) (0.215)
Sector 7 -0.092 -0.071 -0.180 -0.163 -0.222 -0.231
(0.249) (0.228) (0.283) (0.258) (0.234) (0.241)
Log(GDPpc) 0.158* 0.152 0.128
(0.080) (0.091) (0.090)
Inflation -0.007** -0.007* -0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Foreign Banks -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Creditor Rights 0.023 0.027 0.022
(0.030) (0.036) (0.026)
Information Sharing 0.012 0.009 0.036
(0.034) (0.040) (0.028)
Enforcement -0.431** -0.426* -0.419**
(0.188) (0.229) (0.150)
Bank Concentration 0.133 0.380 -0.421
(0.323) (0.341) (0.366)
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.081 0.065 0.099 0.073 0.081 0.059
Number of Observations 5689 5689 3859 3859 1830 1830
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions for the perception-based indicator
perceived access. The dependent variable measures how problematic access to finance is for the operation
and growth of a company and varies from 1 major obstacle to 4 no obstacle. Standard errors are clustered
on country-level and are reported in parenthesis. Sector coding: 1 mining and quarrying, 2 construction,
3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale, retail and repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services, 6 hotel and
restaurants, 7 others. The left out category for age is age 8-13 (firms founded during transition), for nationality
privately-owned firms and mining and quarrying for sectors. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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The regressions are estimated separately for the subsample of firms with credit demand
(Columns 3-4) and firms without credit demand (Columns 5-6). Among firms with
demand for credit, the results are highly similar to the results from the full sample
of firms. Additionally, we find firms that were founded before the transition process to
have a significantly worse perception compared to firms founded during transition, which
was not present in the access approach. In the sample of firms without credit demand,
we found hardly any significant determinants, which indicates that the results on the
perceived access are mainly driven by firms with credit demand. However, the effects are
strong enough to persist when all firms are pooled and differences in demand ignored,
although the fraction of firms without demand is high.
To summarize, the perception-based measure of access identifies the same firm-level
determinants as the direct measurement of access to credit, even if information on credit
demand is not available. It therefore seems to constitute a much better approximation of
access to credit than the usage of credit. However, the increase in R-square from 0.08 to
0.10 (despite the large drop in the number of observations) suggests that the explanatory
power can be increased when additional information on credit demand is available.
1.4 Sensitivity Analysis
1.4.1 Alternative Exclusion Restrictions
For estimating access to credit, we use a probit model with sample selection following
Heckman (1979), which takes into account interdependencies between the selection and
the outcome stage. Identification rests on the exclusion restriction, which requires valid
instruments for the selection equation. In the baseline regressions we have included a
firm’s individual perception of competition and previous investments as instruments.
However, we cannot test whether the exclusion restriction is valid. To assess the
stability of our results, we therefore first estimate the two-stage regression with perceived
competition as the only instrument (leaving out the potentially endogenous investment).
Second, we follow Popov and Udell (2012) and include perceived competition and subsidy
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as exclusion restrictions.13 Popov and Udell (2012) argue that on the one hand, having
applied for state subsidy is likely to be a signal for external financial need and should
constitute a good demand shifter and on the other hand, size, ownership and accounting
standards are more readily observed by the bank than whether the firm receives subsidies.
Further, they assume that firms in more competitive environments will have a higher
demand for external finance, but that it is unlikely that product market competition will
be correlated with the credit decision. Table A.2 presents the results with the alternative
instruments. The results remain very stable. The correlation between the error terms
of the selection and the outcome equation are highly significant (with the exception of
the second specification, where the p-value of the Wald test equals 0.138). Size and
significance of the marginal effects hardly change.
1.4.2 Assumption of Joint Normality
The maximum likelihood estimation of the binary response model with sample selection
requires the assumption of a bivariate normal error distribution. This assumption might
be too strong. As a robustness check, we estimate access to credit with a linear Heckman
two-step procedure that includes the inverse Mills’ ratio as an additional explanatory
variable. The Heckman two-step estimator relies on a weaker distributional assumption
of univariate normality and is expected to be more robust (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
However, if bivariate normality is fulfilled, the maximum likelihood estimator is the more
efficient estimator.14 Table A.3 shows that the estimation results are very stable. The
selection into demand remains significant and the signs and significant levels of most
coefficients do not change either.
13In contrast to Popov and Udell (2012), we use the ordinal values of the variable perceived competition
instead of a binary indication whether the competition is intense, to make full use of the available
variation.
14A detailed theoretical discussion can be found in Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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1.4.3 Standard Errors Clustered on Industry-Country-Level
The standard errors in the baseline regressions are clustered at the country-level for 23
different country clusters. Although this might be a sufficiently large number of clusters,
the underlying assumption for calculating cluster-robust standard errors requires the
number of clusters to go to infinity. To assess whether this assumption is problematic
in our regressions, we re-estimate the baseline regressions with standard errors corrected
on industry-country level. Hereby the number of clusters increases to 154. Correlations
in errors of firms within the same industry in one country are taken into account, while
inter-industry correlations within one country cannot be captured with this clustering
structure. Table A.4 summarizes the results. The standard errors of the firm-level
coefficients are unaffected. The results for the country specific determinants are basically
similar. In the probit model with selection, the presence of foreign banks and the
enforcement of creditor rights have a significant positive coefficient (at the 10 percent
level) and creditor rights keeps a significant positive coefficient. This indicates that our
baseline standard error adjustment on country-level potentially overestimates the size of
the standard errors.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a direct measurement of access to credit, which takes into account
whether a firm that has credit demand is successful in getting access to credit. With this
we investigate how precise different approximating measurements are in predicting credit
constraints. This evaluation is of particular importance as direct measurements for access
to credit are not available when using balance sheet data and are often missing in survey
data. As a consequence, access to credit often has to be approximated by measures
based either on the usage of credit or on perception-based indicators, which both do not
take into account a firm’s demand for credit. Ignoring differences in firm-specific credit
demand can hinder the identification of access to credit, as our main results show.
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First, investigating access to credit we find that the selection into credit demand is not
random and firms do self-select themselves. Not controlling for this selection can lead
to biased estimations, particularly for determinants that affect demand and access in
opposing directions. The effects may offset each other, such that coefficients are not
significantly different from zero in estimating access to credit (e.g., coefficient for foreign
ownership or capacity utilization) or have the wrong sign when the effect of demand
dominates the access effect (e.g., coefficient for state-owned firms). As a consequence,
firms with a lower demand can falsely be classified as credit constrained.
Second, the comparison of different measurements that approximate access to credit
shows that the usage of credit does not allow drawing precise conclusions on credit
constraints. We find considerable differences in the identified determinants of usage and
access, which can be explained by differences in a firm’s demand for credit. Interpreting
the usage of credit in terms of access can both under- and overestimate restricted access,
depending on the direction of the demand effect. The comparison between the direct
access approach and the perception-based indicator, however, shows that these measures
are able to identify firm-level determinants of restricted access, even when information
on demand is not available. Thus, our analysis suggests that perception-based indicators
provide a relatively good measurement for restricted access when information on credit
demand is missing, and are better suited than measurements based on the usage of credit.
With regard to future survey design for investigating access to finance, our results
stress the importance of including questions on the demand for external finance in
questionnaires to be able to directly identify access to finance. Thereby it is of particular
importance that information on demand and usage can be clearly matched, i.e., they
should refer to the same time period (e.g., the previous fiscal year). Moreover, information
on the application for finance is not sufficient to identify financial demand. Firms can be
discouraged from applying for several reasons, which should be considered in the survey
design. To capture potential selection bias, suitable exclusion restrictions for the selection
into demand should be considered beforehand in the list of questions. Furthermore,
our analysis shows perception-based indicators to be valuable approximations. To
increase their precision, we recommend that firms should be likewise requested to
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give information on their financial need in the questionnaire. With respect to future
research, better information on firms’ creditworthiness from matched balance-sheet data
or additional questionnaire information on the necessary balance-sheet items would
significantly improve research on access to finance.
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Chapter 2
Patents in the Financing of R&D
Intensive Start-up Firms: Evidence
from Germany∗
2.1 Introduction
Access to finance is a key determinant of innovation and economic growth. Information
asymmetries and the absence of collateral can lead to market imperfections in financial
markets so that even firms with profitable investment opportunities can be financially
constrained, and hence restricted in their investment decisions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
In particular, highly innovative start-up firms possess only short track records and often
few tangible assets that can be used as collateral. Investment decisions of external
resource holders are therefore made under considerable uncertainty about the survival
probability of the venture. At the same time often substantial resources are required to
fund early-stage projects, while revenues cannot be expected in the near future (Stuart
et al., 1999). As a consequence, financial constraints are expected to be most severe for
these entrepreneurs. Since start-ups in high-technology industries play an important role
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer.
39
Patents in the Financing of R&D Intensive Start-up Firms
for innovation and structural change, these market frictions are expected to result in a
decelerated rate of innovation and an overall slowdown in economic progress.
This paper investigates the question whether patents can mitigate financial constraints of
R&D intensive start-up firms. Patents have the potential to reduce financial constraints
through two different channels. First, the difficulties in getting access to external capital
require innovative start-ups to develop signals for the largely unobservable value of
the company and its commercial potential. Patents might function as signals for the
innovative potential of a firm and its future success. Detailed and well-structured patent
specifications enable a skilled recipient to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of new
inventions and technologies (Harhoff, 2011). The patent system can provide a mechanism
for sorting the quality of innovative activity and reducing information asymmetries, which
can decrease the risk for investors and facilitate the access to external finance for start-up
firms.
Second, patents can serve as assets for financial investors. With the capability of
providing licensing revenues and a salvage value in case of failure, patents exhibit the
properties of collateral. Providing collateral is one important instrument to overcome
information asymmetries in financial markets. Current legislative amendments facilitate
collateralization with intangible assets. With the implementation of Basel II in 2007,
intellectual property rights are accepted for capital adequacy in the European Union. In
2010 the German Accounting Law Modernization Act introduced the option to capitalize
self-created intangible assets in German balance sheet regulations (Natusch, 2009).1 In
a study of U.S. originated secured syndicated loans, Loumioti (2011) shows that the
collateralization of loans with intangible assets has increased in the recent decade and
concludes that the collateralization of intangible assets is a sustainable credit market
innovation that can reduce financial constraints.2
1Bittelmeyer et al. (2008) show in a survey of German companies that although the overall use of
intellectual property rights as collateral is low among small and medium size businesses, the probability
of securing a loan with intellectual property rights increases by 92 percent for R&D intensive firms.
2Loumioti (2011) finds that 21 percent of all loans include intangible assets as loan collateral.
Although loans collateralized with intangibles have higher loan prices, they do not perform worse than
other secured loans, so that collateralization of intangibles is not found to be associated with risky
lending.
40
Patents in the Financing of R&D Intensive Start-up Firms
This paper empirically validates the theoretical predictions and investigates the role of
patents in the financing of young ventures. Therefore, we develop a precise measure of
access to finance, which takes account a firm’s financial demand and considers whether
a firm that demands a particular type of financing is successful in obtaining it. We
separately investigate the impact of patents on the usage, demand, and access to
external capital and thereby disentangle demand and supply side effects. To establish
a causal effect of patenting, we use an instrumental-variable approach that takes into
account potential endogeneity and reverse causality of patenting. We instrument a
firm’s patenting activity with the average patenting activity in the same 2-digit industry.
Patenting varies across sectors due to differences in the effectiveness in patent protection
(Cohen et al., 2000) and the complexity of technologies, which should be unrelated to a
firm’s individual access to finance. To capture variation in patent values, we use direct
valuations by the patent owners to construct value-weighted patent counts.
For the analysis, we use detailed firm-level survey data on German start-up firms from
high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries taken from the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel.
The survey has been conducted since 2008 and contains about 6000 German start-up
firms per wave. Focusing on high-tech start-up firms and providing detailed information
on financing and patenting, this dataset is ideally suited to investigate the role of patents
in the financing of R&D intensive start-up firms.
The analysis on the effect of patents in the financing of start-ups reveals two important
results. First, we find strong evidence for the endogeneity of patenting. We show that
not taking into account issues of endogeneity and reverse causality can lead to highly
biased estimates. Second, our results indicate that patents have a significantly positive
effect on the usage of venture capital and bank financing, in particular when differences in
patent values are considered. An increase in the usage of external finance may, however,
not be fully attributable to an improved access to finance, since an increased financial
demand of patenting firms could drive the results. The detailed financial information
from the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel allows to disentangle the demand and supply side
effects and to separately estimate the impact of patents on demand and access to finance.
Our findings show that patenting significantly increases the demand for venture capital
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and bank finance. After controlling for financial demand, we find no significant effect of
patents on the access to venture capital or bank finance.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, most of the previous studies on the role
of patents in financing have not considered issues of endogeneity and reverse causality
of patenting.3 Thus it is not clear whether positive associations that were found in the
literature can be interpreted as causal effects or mere correlations. We contribute to
the literature by using an instrumental variable approach to establish a causal effect of
patents and evaluate the extent of endogeneity.
Second, using the detailed financial information, we identify a firm’s financial demand
and investigate whether a firm that has demand for a specific type of finance is successful
in obtaining it. Controlling for a firm’s financial demand is essential, since firms that do
not use external financing sources can either be restricted in their access to finance or
might instead simply have no demand for this source of finance. Similarly, an increase in
the usage of finance can be attributed to an improved access to finance or to an increase
in financial demand. Previous studies have confirmed a positive effect of patents on the
usage of venture capital finance. However, since demand and supply side effects are not
disentangled in this financial measure, the alternative explanations for these findings,
namely that a greater financial demand of patenting firms is driving the results, cannot
be ruled out. To our knowledge, we are the first that separately investigate the impact of
patents on the usage, demand and access to to external finance and thereby disentangle
demand and supply side effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the relevant literature. The dataset
and definitions of the key variables are described in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we
present the empirical approach and discuss the identification strategy. The results are
summarized in Section 2.5, Section 2.6 presents robustness checks. Section 2.7 concludes.
3One important exception is the study by Conti et al. (2013), which is discussed in Section 2.2.
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2.2 Related Literature
The traditional function of the patent system is to foster innovations. Innovations exhibit
the characteristics of public goods. Once the information of an invention is revealed,
the knowledge is non-rival and non-excludable. The disclosure of inventions in patent
specifications reveals information in such a way that following inventors can build on the
newest stage of development. In exchange, the patentee gets the right to exclude others
from the commercial use of the patented invention. Additional rewards originate from the
possibility of licensing technologies and earning revenues from royalties. The prospective
monopoly rents create incentives for the cost-intensive and uncertain R&D efforts and
should increase the innovation activity in an economy.
Only in the recent literature has a signaling function of patents been considered (Long,
2002). According to Spence (1973) a signal should be costly to obtain, whereby the
signaling costs have to be negatively correlated with productivity. The non-obviousness
condition requires the technology to be sufficiently inventive, so that innovative and
productive firms should exhibit lower patenting costs. Further, a patent application
requires effort and time, strict guidelines have to be fulfilled, and the technological
information must be edited in a structured manner (Harhoff, 2011).
The literature on entrepreneurship has identified three classes of information mechanisms
for signaling the quality of new ventures. First, one strand of the literature emphasizes the
importance of the educational background and reputation of an entrepreneur, including
entrepreneurial experiences and former employment in high-status firms.4 Second, it
is argued that relationships with high-class affiliations can reduce the uncertainty for
third parties.5 Organizations of high reputation are perceived to have strong evaluative
competences, so that affiliations with prominent partners can be trustworthy signals for
the future success of a new venture (Stuart et al., 1999). The involvement of venture
capitalists or prominent investment banks can certify the quality of a venture for initial
public offerings and thereby lower the costs of going public (e.g., Megginson and Weiss,
1991; Gulati and Higgins, 2002). The third category of signaling mechanisms are previous
4See, e.g., Shane and Stuart (2002), Agarwal et al. (2004).
5See, e.g., Baum and Oliver (1991), Podolny (1994), Rao (2006).
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activities of companies, whereby patenting falls in this category (Harhoff, 2011). The
ability to patent new technologies signals a firm’s technological ability and can be an
indication of high-quality scientific and engineering employees (Stuart et al., 1999).
However, it is often difficult to establish causal effects of signaling. With regard to
prominent affiliations, it is not possible to disentangle pure signaling effects from real
benefits such as access to valuable information and resources. Affiliations such as venture
capitalists or investment banks carefully select the most promising start-up firms, so that
a positive association of high-class partners could be due to a careful selection of high
quality firms.
The relevance of patents specifically to the process of obtaining external finance has been
highlighted in the literature only recently. In general, a positive correlation is found
between patents and venture capital financing (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004; Mann
and Sager, 2007). Using matching procedures, Engel and Keilbach (2007) confirm that
venture-capital funded German firms own more patents and can show that these patents
are obtained before the investment decision of venture capitalists. They conclude that
venture capitalists choose firms with demonstrated innovative output, such that owning
patents increases the probability of obtaining venture capital finance.
Haeussler et al. (2009) investigate the signaling effect of patents on venture capital during
the process of patenting. In a hazard rate analysis of venture-capital backed German
and British biotechnology firms, they show that patent applications are associated with
earlier use of venture capital, and highlight that venture capitalists pay attention to
patent quality (approximated by forward citations).
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) find for U.S. software industries that firms having higher
numbers of patents are more likely to receive funding from venture capitalists, even when
patent thickets are present in the market. Further, they show that patent applications
seem to matter more than patent grants. Despite the benefits from holding patents,
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) emphasize that a large proportion of the sampled firms
did not apply for patents and interpret this as an indication that the causality between
funding and patenting may run in the opposite direction, so that firms that get access to
external funding are more able to finance the substantial cost of patent prosecution. An
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alternative explanation for these findings would be that patenting firms have developed
new technologies and have a higher demand for external finance. This would also support
the finding that patent applications appear to be more relevant than patent grants, since
the financial demand should be highest when applying for patent protection for a newly
developed technology.
Using a sample of U.S. semiconductor firms, Hsu and Ziedonis (2007) confirm a quality
signal of patents on the estimate of start-up value by venture capital investors. They
emphasize that signaling effects are larger in the early financing rounds, interpreting
patents as a mechanism for overcoming the problem of the liability of newness. The
stronger effect of patents in the early financing rounds could also be due to the fact
that young ventures that, in particular, are at the beginning of their product cycle, have
a higher financial demand and at the same time more intensively patent their newly
developed technologies.
Conti et al. (2013) are the first to consider the potential endogeneity of patenting in
start-up financing. They carry out a 2SLS estimation and instrument patenting with
the number of founders with a Ph.D. in science or engineering. The acquired knowledge
background should reduce the cost of making a patentable invention. However, the
instrument is still endogeneous to the unobserved quality of the founders. They confirm
a positive effect of patents on the usage of venture capital.
With regard to bank finance, there have been only a few studies so far. Audretsch
et al. (2012) investigate the signaling effects of patents and prototypes on the usage of
private equity as well as debt financing. Using a web-based survey for a sample of 900
persons that are planning to start a new venture, they divide the sample into ventures
in the planning-stage and ventures in the early start-up stage. While no effect of patents
and prototypes can be found in the planning stage, they confirm a positive correlation
of patents and prototypes with the usage of venture capital in the start-up stage. With
regard to debt financing, no effect has been found. Heger and Hussinger (2012) investigate
the effects of pending patents on the market launch of new products and the usage of
external financing for German high-tech start-ups. They find that both granted patents
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and pending patent applications are associated with a higher probability of using venture
capital, while no effects for the usage of debt financing could be found.
In comparison to these studies, our paper contains detailed considerations of a firm’s
financial demand. In previous studies, the supply side effect, i.e. an improvement in
the access to finance of firms that have demand, was not disentangled from the demand
side effects. Consequently, previous findings of a signaling effect of patents could be
partly driven by an omitted financial demand of patenting firms. Furthermore, using an
instrumental variable approach, our study captures potential problems of endogeneity
and reverse causality, which has often been ignored in previous studies.
2.3 Data
For our analysis we use the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, which provides firm-level data
on German start-up firms. Conducted since 2008, it covers on a yearly base about 6000
German start-up firms and contains detailed information on financing strategies and
innovation activities, as well as detailed founder characteristics. The selection of firms is
a random sample from the database of Creditreform, which is the largest credit rating
agency in Germany. The survey considers firms that were founded within three years
before the inquiry date. Stratification ensures that half of the surveyed firms operate in
high-tech sectors. For the analysis, we consider firms from the high-tech sectors superior
technology manufacturing, high technology manufacturing, technology-intensive services
and software, as well as the technology-intensive sectors non-high-tech manufacturing
and skill-intensive services and drop firms from non technology-intensive sectors.6
With regard to the financing strategy, information on the usage of different financial
sources is available, including bank financing and venture capital financing. In addition,
information on financial frictions with each particular financing source is available. This
allows us to draw inferences about the financial demand separately for various financial
6Table B.1 in Appendix B summarizes the information on the aggregation of industries. Further
information on the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel can be found in Fryges et al. (2009).
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sources and to construct a measure of access to finance, which takes into account whether
a firm that has demand for a particular source of finance is successful in obtaining it.
For the analysis, we use the 2008 wave of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, which combines
comprehensive financial information with detailed information on a firm’s patenting
activity. Only in the 2008 wave, firms were questioned on their usage of intellectual
property rights and on the importance of these rights for the company. Firms indicate
whether patents are used or planned, and give information on the number of granted
patents. Patenting firms give detailed information on the strategic functions of patenting
and evaluate the importance of their patent rights for protecting their own competitive
advantages.
Table 2.1 provides information on the patenting activities across the included sector
groups. The variable DPAT indicates whether a firm has a positive amount of granted
patents. Sectors with the highest proportion of patenting firms are high technology
manufacturing (20.6 percent) and superior technology manufacturing (12.3 percent).
PAT measures the total number of patent grants.7 The highest average number of
patents can be found in the sector high technology manufacturing (0.939), followed
by superior technology manufacturing (0.526) and technology intensive services (0.293).
VAL summarizes the evaluations of the importance of patents for protecting a firm’s
competitive advantages. The valuations vary between 1 "not important" and 5 "very
important". Firms in the sector superior technology manufacturing exhibit the highest
valuations for their patent rights (mean of 4.226), while also firms in the sectors
non-high-tech manufacturing and skill-intensive services, in which by far fewer firms
patent, have relatively high average valuations of patent rights (4.051 and 4.130).
2.3.1 Measuring Access to Finance
We are interested in the role of patents in the external financing of start-ups. The
dependent variable should provide measures of the access to bank financing and venture
capital financing. A precise measure of the access to finance ideally takes into account
7To control for outliers, we truncate the total number of patent grants at 22, which corresponds to
the 99.74 percentile of the distribution.
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Table 2.1: Patenting across sectors
Sector DPAT PAT VAL
Superior technology manufacturing 0.123 0.526 4.226
High technology manufacturing 0.206 0.939 4.145
Technology-intensive services 0.049 0.293 3.917
Software supply and consultancy 0.047 0.065 4.000
Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.064 0.170 4.051
Skill-intensive services 0.033 0.111 4.130
All 0.067 0.274 4.062
a firm’s financial demand and considers whether a firm that demands external finance is
successful in obtaining it. However, due to data limitations, a precise measure is often
not available and indirect approximations of the access to finance have been widely used.
In the literature on the financial role of patents, a very common approximation is the
usage of external finance. E.g., Conti et al. (2013) use the binary indication of the usage
of venture capital, while Audretsch et al. (2012) use the binary indication of the usage of
debt financing in their survey of the signaling role of patent protection.
If a firm receives venture capital financing, it clearly has access to venture capital. Yet,
it is not clear whether a firm that does not use venture capital, is indeed financially
constrained or whether it has no demand for it, e.g., because other sources of external
finance are available. As a result, the comparison of firms that use a specific source of
finance with firms that do not use this source may not reveal differences solely in the
access to finance, but also differences in the demand for that financing source. Start-up
firms, especially those which have patented new inventions, are probably in a growth
stage, where it is necessary to invest in production facilities, distribution networks, or
marketing, so that a simultaneous impact of patents on financial demand is very likely.
Consequently, approximating access by the usage of finance cannot disentangle supply
and demand side effects of financing.8 To separate the supply and demand side effects,
it is essential to identify a firm’s financial demand.
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel allows us to construct a direct measure of the access to
bank financing and to venture capital. We observe whether a firm uses a particular source
8See Hainz and Nabokin (2013) for a detailed discussion and evaluation of different approximate
measures for the access to finance.
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of external finance and have information whether that firm has experienced constraints in
getting access for each particular source of finance. Combining this information enables
us to approximate a firm’s financial demand and construct a direct measure of its access
to finance.
The variables Usage-Bank and Usage-VC are binary variables indicating whether a firm
uses bank financing and venture capital financing, respectively. An increase in this
measure could indicate a better access to finance, however, it cannot be ruled out that an
increase is driven by an increase in demand. The binary variables FC-VC and FC-BANK
indicate whether a firm has experienced financial constraints regarding venture capital
or bank financing. This measure includes observations of all firms, i.e., firms with and
without financial demand.9 To construct a variable for financial demand, we combine the
information on usage and financial friction in the following way. We categorize a firm
that uses a particular source of finance as one having demand for that source. Further,
a firm is assumed to have demand for a source of finance if it does not use it but has
experienced financial frictions with that source. Finally, we categorize a firm that does
not use a source of finance and also has not experienced financial friction with this source
as having no demand for this source of finance. The binary variable Demand-Bank
(Demand-VC ) equals one if a firm demands bank financing (venture capital financing).
To evaluate the access to finance, only firms with demand are relevant. The binary
variable Access-Bank equals one if a firm has demand and has not experienced financial
frictions with bank financing (Demand-Bank=1 and FC-Bank=0), it equals zero if a firm
has demand but has experienced financial frictions with bank financing (Demand-Bank=1
and FC-Bank=1). Table 2.2 summarizes the coding of the dependent variables Usage,
Demand and Access and further clarifies the difference between a measure of usage of
finance (that does not take into account whether a firm has financial demand) and a
measure of access to finance (that does consider only firms with financial demand).
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. Regarding bank
finance, 17 percent of all companies demand bank finance, while only 55 percent of them
9Note that it is not clear whether a firm that indicates not having experienced financial frictions,
had indeed access to that source of finance or whether it had simply no demand for it. For this reason
we do not directly use this measure as dependent variable.
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Table 2.2: Coding of the dependent variables
Definition Usage Demand Access
No usage and not financially constrained 0 0 -
No usage and financially constrained 0 1 0
Usage and financially constrained 1 1 0
Usage and not financially constrained 1 1 1
get access to loans. The overall usage of bank loans is therefore relatively low (11 percent).
Venture capital financing is suitable for a small fraction of firms. In the sample, three
percent of all firms use this source of finance. The share of firms demanding venture
capital financing amounts to four percent, so that the resulting access rate is quite high
(69 percent). This shows that the German venture capital market may be underdeveloped
and suggests that mostly suitable firms apply for venture capital financing, such that a
self-selection of firms seems to take place before the application process.
Panel A of Table 2.4 compares patenting and non-patenting firms in terms of the financial
variables. We find that patenting firms have on average a higher usage of venture capital
than non-patenting firms. At the same time, patenting firms have a higher probability of
being financially constrained with regard to venture capital, which can be explained
by a significantly higher demand for venture capital financing. For bank financing,
we find that patenting firms have a higher probability of being financially constrained
and simultaneously a higher demand for bank financing. These findings emphasize how
important it is to control for a firm’s financial demand to clearly separate demand and
supply side effects.
2.3.2 Measuring Patenting Activities
To analyze the effect of patents on the access to finance, we use two different measures
of a firm’s patenting activity. First, we use the unweighted sum of patent grants (PAT).
However, since the patent count itself is not a precise measure of inventive output (Harhoff
et al., 2003), we also take into account the value of patent rights and construct an index
of value-weighted patent counts.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Financial Variables
Usage-VC 2830 0.029 0.168 0 1
FC-VC 2847 0.012 0.107 0 1
Demand-VC 2824 0.038 0.190 0 1
Access-VC 106 0.689 0.465 0 1
Usage-Bank 2829 0.111 0.314 0 1
FC-Bank 2847 0.079 0.270 0 1
Demand-Bank 2823 0.174 0.379 0 1
Access-Bank 492 0.547 0.498 0 1
Patent Variables
DPAT 2780 0.067 0.250 0 1
PAT 2780 0.274 1.879 0 22
VAL 325 4.062 1.187 1 5
PAT*VAL 2780 1.184 8.675 0 110
Patent Functions
Finance 334 2.997 1.537 1 5
Imitation 336 4.006 1.320 1 5
Licensing 337 2.893 1.534 1 5
Negotiation 335 3.015 1.432 1 5
Infringement 332 3.247 1.493 1 5
Reputation 334 3.506 1.308 1 5
Controls
SIZE 2860 1.634 6.530 0 250
EXPR 2860 14.971 9.222 1 55
EDUC 2860 0.501 0.500 0 1
CORP 2860 0.026 0.158 0 1
INNO 2860 1.541 0.980 1 4
CAPA 2860 79.289 23.769 0 100
51
Patents in the Financing of R&D Intensive Start-up Firms
Table 2.4: Patenting firms versus non-patenting firms
Patenting Non-Patenting Mean Diff.
Firms Firms
Panel A: Financial Variables
FC-VC 0.032 0.010 0.022***
Usage-VC 0.098 0.024 0.074***
Demand-VC 0.125 0.032 0.093***
Access-VC 0.783 0.771 0.012
FC-Bank 0.141 0.074 0.067***
Usage-Bank 0.120 0.109 0.010
Demand-Bank 0.239 0.169 0.070**
Access-Bank 0.409 0.563 -0.154*
Panel B: Control Variables
SIZE 3.774 1.480 2.294***
EXPR 16.511 14.857 1.654**
EDUC 0.715 0.485 0.230***
CORP 0.032 0.025 0.007
INNO 2.554 1.470 1.084***
CAPA 79.522 79.251 0.271
Notes: The table provides mean comparison tests for various firm characteristics between patenting
and non-patenting firms. ***, **, * denote that the difference in means is statistically significant from
zero at a 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level.
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The value distribution of patents is known to be notably right-skewed. Different methods
have been developed in the literature to approximate the value of patents. Information
from the patent specification provides proxies for the patent value. The number of
(backward) citations indicates on how many earlier inventions, that verifiably fulfill the
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness, a patent was built (Hall et al., 2005). Also
the size of the patent family, i.e., the number of countries in which protection of the
inventions was applied for, can indicate highly valuable patents. Further, the number of
patent renewals can reveal a firm’s private patent value (Lanjouw et al., 2003). Sherry
and Teece (2004) approximate the value of patents by the number of appeals against a
patent application. Only competitors that believe the patent imposes limits on their own
business would bear the costs of such opposition, so that these patents are expected to
be high value patents.
Harhoff et al. (2003) validate these indirect measures by using survey data of German
patent holders with direct information on the value of their patent rights. They confirm
that the number of references to the patent literature and the number of citations that a
patent receives in the future is significantly positively related to the private patent value.
Further, oppositions and a large international patent family are found to be relevant
signals of valuable patents.
For our survey of start-up firms that were all founded between the years 2005 and 2008,
indirect quality measures like forward citations or the number of patent renewals are
not applicable due to the short future time horizon. To approximate the value of the
granted patents , we instead use, similar to Harhoff et al. (2003), a direct valuation by the
patent holder. Harhoff et al. (2003) use survey information on a hypothetical price for
which the original inventor would be willing to sell the patent right. We instead use the
individual evaluation of how important the patents of a firm are for protecting its own
competitive advantages. With this information, we construct the value-weighted index
of patent counts PAT*VAL, which is an interaction between a firm’s number of granted
patents (PAT) and its valuation of its own patent rights.10 A caveat of our valuation
measure may be that it is not patent specific, so that the valuation cannot be attributed
10Non-patenting firms have a PAT*VAL value of zero.
53
Patents in the Financing of R&D Intensive Start-up Firms
to specific patents. In our sample of start-up firms, it makes little difference whether the
valuation is patent specific or refers to all patents, since most firms have only few granted
patents. Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the patenting variables.
2.4 Empirical Approach
To analyze the role of patents in the access to external finance, we estimate varieties of
the following baseline regression. FINANCE represents the different dependent variables
usage, demand and access for the financial sources venture capital and bank finance.
PATENTS stands for different measures of a firm’s patenting activity.
FINANCEi = β0 + β1PATENTSi + β2SIZEi + β3CORPi + β4R&Di (2.1)
+ β5CAPAi + β6INNOi + β7EDUCi + β8EXPRi + i
To establish a causal effect of patents on the access to finance, it is essential to take into
account potential issues of endogeneity and reverse causality of patenting activities.
Patenting is very likely to be correlated with unobserved firm characteristics related to
a firm’s capability, innovativeness and riskiness. Highly capable firms innovate more
successfully and therefore should have a higher number of granted patents. In an ideal
experimental setting, patenting would be allowed to a random subset of equally capable
firms. By this means, comparing patenting and non-patenting firms in their access to
finance would indicate a signaling effect of patents. However, with regard to patenting,
a random setting is hardly possible. In a non-experimental setting though, ignoring an
omitted variable bias due to unobserved firm capability could over- or underestimate the
effect of patents on the access to finance.
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Further, patent applications involve filing fees, maintenance fees, and costs for legal
advice. It is very likely that a better access to external finance therefore influences a
firm’s decision to patent, causing a problem of reverse causality.11
To guard against omitted variable bias and reverse causality, we apply an instrumental
variable approach and instrument the number of a firm’s patents by the average number
of patents of firms within the same industry.12 This instrumental strategy is based on the
following reasoning. Patenting activities differ significantly among sectors. One reason for
this variation is that products consist of differently complex technologies. The respective
technologies thereby differ in the number of separate inventions that they build on, and
in the number of separate patent applications.
Another important reason for patenting activities on varying intensity is that the
effectiveness of patents, i.e., the evaluation of patents in terms of protecting intellectual
property, is perceived very differently among sectors. In a survey of U.S. manufacturing
firms, Cohen et al. (2000) show that the perceived effectiveness of patent protection varies
substantially across industries, being most important in medical equipment and drugs,
followed by special purpose machinery, computers, and auto parts. They also find that
firms value other protection strategies, such as secrecy and lead time, equally important
or even more important than patent protection. These results demonstrate that there are
important sector-specific differences in the strategies for protecting intellectual property
rights, which results in different evaluations of patents and different patenting strategies
across industries.
Consequently, the evaluation of patents and the number of patents of firms within the
same industry should be a strong predictor for a firm’s patenting activity and patent
evaluation. We define firms that are active in the same two-digit NACE industry as
relevant firms and instrument a firm’s patents by the sector-specific average number of
11In the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, firms report that the costs for their recent patent have been
$38,000 (Graham et al., 2009). Thereby, also opportunity costs associated with time invested in the
preparation of patent applications by managers and engineers can be significant (Graham and Sichelman,
2008).
12A similar strategy has been used in a different setting by Desai et al. (2006) and Gumpert et al.
(2011).
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patents.13 At the same time, the sector specific patent evaluation and the patenting
activity should have no direct effect on a firm’s individual access to finance and should
create an exogenous variation in a firm’s patenting activity. Further, the average number
of patents within the same industry should be exogenous to a particular firm’s unobserved
characteristics.
Further, one might be concerned that the described problem of reverse causality might
also be relevant for a firm’s R&D activity. Firms that obtain access to external finance
might invest the additionally available capital in further R&D. Since R&D is expected
to be an essential determinant for the access to venture capital, we include a firm’s R&D
activity as explanatory variable. However, to avoid potential problems of reverse causality
with regard to R&D, we apply a similar strategy than for patenting activities (measures
by the number of employees that deal with research and development activities), and
instrument a firm’s R&D activity with the average R&D activity of firms within the
same sector.
We additionally control for a variety of firm- and founder-specific characteristics. With
regard to general firm characteristics, we control for firm size. SIZE measures the number
of full-time employees. The dummy variable CORP indicates whether the firm is part of
a larger corporation. To further approximate a firm’s capability and success, we control
for the degree of capacity utilization, CAPA. As argued above, the patent activity of a
firm is expected to be highly correlated with a firm’s innovativeness. Although we try
to disentangle patenting from innovativeness with an instrumental variable approach, we
include a measure of innovativeness to strengthen the results: INNO indicates whether a
firm has introduced a market innovation at regional, national or international level since
foundation.
To approximate the human capital of the founder, we include measures of education and
experience. The dummy variable EDUC equals one if a founder has a university education
(i.e., applied university degree, university degree, or PhD). The variable EXPR specifies
how many years of industry experience the founder already has in the relevant industry.14
13We disregard sector classes with less than 5 firms and finally get 31 different sector classes. Note
that this instrumenting strategy does not allow including sector dummies.
14Table B.2 in Appendix B gives detailed definitions of all variables.
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Panel B of Table 2.4 compares patenting and non-patenting firms in terms of the
explanatory variables. We find that patenting firms are on average larger in size, have
more experienced founders with a higher level of education, and are more innovative than
non-patenting firms.
2.5 Results
Before we turn to the question of whether patents can mitigate financial constraints
of R&D intensive firms, we present a descriptive analysis on the various functions of
patents. The detailed evaluations and perceptions of the surveyed firms allow us to
assess the relevance of a financial function of patents and to identify the types of firms
that rely on the financial function of patents. This is followed by the analysis on the
effect of patenting on the access to external finance. We explore two financial sources:
bank financing and venture capital financing.
2.5.1 Patent Functions
The traditional role of patents is to protect firms from imitation, to avoid litigation, or to
obtain returns from licensing. Besides these traditional functions, patents can also have a
financial function, by facilitating the access to finance through signaling the capability of
the firm or through providing collateral. To gain a better insight into the role of patents
in the financing of start-ups, we start with a descriptive analysis of whether start-ups
rely on a financial function of patents. The 2008 wave of the KfW/ZEW Start-up survey
contains a detailed questionnaire about the potential functions of patents. Firms that
are using patents or planning to patent are asked to evaluate how important particular
functions of patents are for their own company. The assessment ranges from 1 "not
important" to 5 "very important". Table 2.3 summarizes the mean evaluations among
firms. Figure 2.1 presents the detailed distributions of the single answers.
Among all patent functions, "protection against imitation" plays a major role (mean
evaluation of 4.0). Of all patenting start-up companies, 73 percent assess patents as
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Figure 2.1: Importance of patents
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important or very important for protection against imitation (see Figure 2.1). The second
most important function is "improving reputation" (3.5), which could be interpreted as a
general signaling function to third parties. The functions "avoiding patent infringements"
(3.2), "improving position in negotiation" (3.0), "obtaining revenues from licensing" (2.9)
and "improving access to finance" (3.0) exhibit very similar mean evaluations. However,
it is important to note that 43 percent of all start-up firms value patents as important or
very important in improving access to finance, so that the financial function of patents
seems to play a significant role for certain firms. The high standard deviation of the
financial patent function also indicates that its valuation is very heterogeneous among
firms.
To identify which type of firm relies on a financial function of patents, we estimate
ordinary least-squares regressions of the financial evaluation on firm characteristics,
and compare the results with estimates for the traditional function "protection against
imitation" (Table 2.5).15 In addition to the above introduced control variables, we include
15In the sensitivity analysis, bivariate ordered probit regressions are presented, which additionally
capture interdependencies between the evaluations of a particular firm, but require stronger distributional
assumptions. The results are very similar.
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variables that capture the financial situation of a firm. The binary variable Demand-Bank
indicates whether a firm has demand for bank financing, Usage-Bank captures whether a
firm uses bank financing, and FC-Bank indicates whether a firm has experienced financial
frictions in obtaining bank financing (there are analogues for venture capital financing).16
Table 2.5: Financial functions of patents
Protection from Imitation Improving Access to Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIZE 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EXPR -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
EDUC -0.321∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.281∗ -0.014 0.002 0.023
(0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187)
CORP 0.783∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ -0.626 -0.672 -0.529
(0.170) (0.173) (0.170) (0.505) (0.509) (0.502)
INNO 0.047 0.047 0.056 0.142∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
CAPA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D 0.020 0.020 0.023 -0.001 0.001 0.025
(0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039)
Demand-Bank -0.026 -0.098
(0.170) (0.201)
Demand-VC 0.085 0.765∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.238)
Usage-Bank 0.011 -0.025
(0.201) (0.237)
Usage-VC 0.108 0.841∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.262)
FC-Bank 0.009 -0.055
(0.213) (0.257)
FC-VC 0.097 0.842∗∗
(0.317) (0.369)
Constant 4.459∗∗∗ 4.455∗∗∗ 4.396∗∗∗ 3.569∗∗∗ 3.584∗∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.428) (0.409) (0.493) (0.497) (0.475)
N 330 330 333 328 328 331
R-squared 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.034
Notes: The table presents the coefficients from OLS regressions of the importance of the patent functions
"protection from imitation" and "improving access to finance". All standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 0.01 0.05
and 0.10 level.
16We do not include Access-Bank and Access-VC as control variables, since the number of observations
for these regressions would be too low.
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We find that larger firms and firms that are part of a larger company have a significantly
higher appreciation for the traditional function "protection against imitation", while these
determinants do not play a role for the evaluation of the financial function. Firms
that are characterized as innovative (in terms of having introduced market innovations
since foundation) have a significantly higher valuation for the financial function of
patents, while they do not differ in their assessment of the traditional "protection
against imitation" function. Further, more established firms (measured by the capacity
utilization) have a lower appreciation for the financial patent function, although no
differences for the imitation function exist.
With regard to the financial control variables, we find interesting differences between
both patent functions. All financial variables are insignificant in the regressions of the
traditional patent function, indicating that the financial situation does not change the
evaluation for protection from imitation. For the patent function "improving access to
finance", we find a significantly higher evaluation by firms that demand venture capital,
firms that use venture capital, and firms that have experienced financial friction with
venture capital, while no effect for any variable of bank financing is found.
The results show that improving access to finance is an important patent function among
R&D intensive start-ups. In particular, innovative firms and less established firms that
exhibit a higher riskiness, as well as firms that demand venture capital financing rely on
a financial function of patents.
2.5.2 Patents in External Financing
To investigate whether patents improve the access to external finance, we estimate 2SLS
regressions of Equation 2.1. Table 2.6 summarizes the results for bank financing, Table
2.7 for venture capital financing. As dependent variables we use different financial
measurements. Usage (Columns 1-4) indicates whether a firm uses bank finance (venture
capital finance) and captures supply and demand side effects. The estimations for
Demand (Columns 5-8) and Access (Columns 9-12) disentangle these effects. In each
specification, we use two different measures for the patenting activity of a firm. The
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variable PAT measures a firm’s unweighted sum of patents, the variable PAT*VAL
constitutes a value-weighted sum of patents. PAT is instrumented by the industry-specific
average unweighted sum of patents, PAT*VAL is instrumented by the unweighted and
value-weighted sum of patents. Further, R&D is instrumented by the sector-specific
R&D average. To evaluate the severity of the endogeneity problem, we also present OLS
regressions that do not take into account the potential endogeneity of patenting and
R&D. In all specifications, we use robust standard errors.
2.5.2.1 Bank Financing
The estimated coefficients distinctly differ between the 2SLS and the OLS estimations.
The robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that PAT
(PAT*VAL) and R&D are exogenous, indicating the presence of endogeneity and
consequently inconsistent OLS estimations. The F -test for joint significance of the
instruments in the first stage regression is rejected at high significance levels in all
specifications (with the exception of the patenting variables in the access regressions).
The values of the F -statistic vary between 8.02 and 11.41 in the usage and demand
regressions. In the access regression only firms with demand for bank finance are
considered, so that the number of observations is considerably smaller. This could explain
the low F -statistics for the patenting variables. In the following we will focus on the 2SLS
results.
For the usage of bank finance, we find significant positive effects for both measures of
patenting. An increase by one standard deviation in the unweighted sum of patents (PAT)
increases the probability of using bank finance by 13.8 percentage points; an increase in
the value-weighted sum of patents (PAT*VAL) increases the probability of using bank
finance by 23.1 percentage points. However, an increase in usage of bank finance can be
attributed to a facilitated access to bank finance as well as to an increase in the demand
for bank finance.
When disentangling the usage of bank finance by demand and access, we find that both
patenting measures significantly increase the demand for bank finance. An increase by
one standard deviation of the unweighted (value-weighted) patent sum increases the
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probability of demanding bank finance by 31.9 (24.8) percentage points. However, with
respect to the access measure that takes into account only firms with demand for bank
finance, we do not find significant effects of patents. Hence, although we find that patents
increase the usage of finance, we cannot show that patents indeed improve the access to
bank finance, given that a firm has demand. We observe that an important part in the
increase of usage of bank finance can be explained by an increase in demand for bank
finance of patenting firms.
With regard to R&D, we find that firms with a higher level of R&D have a significantly
lower probability of using bank finance. When disentangling the effects of demand and
access, we find that these firms exhibit a lower demand for bank finance. At the same
time, given that a firm has demand, a firm with higher R&D levels more often faces
financial frictions with regard to bank finance. This could indicate that bank finance
may be less suitable for R&D intensive firms, which generally exhibit a higher risk of
failure, and further, that these firms may anticipate a restricted access to bank finance
and therefore less often apply for it. It is conceivable that these firms fall back, e.g., on
venture capital finance. In the further analysis of venture capital, we find a significantly
higher demand for R&D intensive firms (in the specification with PAT*VAL), while we
do not observe significant differences in the use of venture capital.
For the other control variables, we find that larger firms have a significantly higher usage
of bank finance (in the specification with PAT*VAL) and a significantly higher demand
for bank finance. Further, innovative firms have a higher usage and demand of bank
financing (in the specification with PAT*VAL). For the access to bank finance, we find
a better access for firms that are part of a larger company and for firms with a high
capability utilization, which can be seen as more established firms.
2.5.2.2 Venture Capital Financing
The results for venture capital finance are summarized in Table 2.7. We find very similar,
yet less robust results than for bank finance. The estimated coefficients clearly differ
between the 2SLS and the OLS estimations. In the demand estimations, the robust
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity for the variables for patenting
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and R&D, while the null cannot be rejected in the usage specifications (p-values 0.118
and 0.108). For the access regressions in the specification with PAT, the test rejects
exogeneity. For the usage and demand regressions, the F -test for joint significance of the
instruments is rejected at high significance levels and the F -statistic varies again between
8.02 and 11.41. To summarize, we find evidence that the variables for patenting and R&D
are endogenous in the regressions of venture capital financing. The instruments are found
to be sufficiently strong in the estimations for usage and demand, while the estimations
for access build on few observations and exhibit very low F -statistics for the instruments.
For the usage of venture capital, we find a significant positive effect for the value-weighted
sum of patents PAT*VAL, indicating that a higher number of valuable patents increases
the probability of using venture capital. An increase by one standard deviation of the
weighted patent sum increases the probability of usage by 6.0 percentage points. The
unweighted sum of patents, however, is not significant, which might suggest that the value
of patents is more important than the pure patent counts. Further, by splitting usage
into demand and access, we can clearly identify demand driven effects. A one standard
deviation increase of the unweighted (value-weighted) patent sum leads to an increase by
9.8 (8.6) percentage points in the probability of having demand for venture capital. With
respect to access to venture capital, we find no significant effects of patents. However,
the number of observations that can be considered for estimating access is much smaller
than for the usage and demand estimations, resulting in a smaller statistical power.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Nonlinear Estimations of Patent Functions
To predict the types of firms that highly rely on a financial function of patents, we have
estimated OLS estimations. Since the dependent variables take values between 1 and
4, we re-estimate the regressions of Table 2.5 with a nonlinear ordered probit model
that takes account of the categorical structure of the dependent variable. Table B.3 in
Appendix B presents the results. The estimates are very similar to the OLS regressions.
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We find the same firm characteristics that are associated with a higher reliance on the
financial function of patents. Only a firm’s size is not significant in the regressions for
the patent function "protection against imitation".
Further, if the errors for the outcomes are correlated for individual firms, a seemingly
unrelated regression that models the joint distribution of the errors would be more efficient
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Since a system of linear regressions with identical control
variables collapses to equation-by-equation OLS regressions, we estimate a nonlinear
bivariate ordered probit model. Table B.4 presents the results. The first two columns
refer to the simultaneous estimations of both patent functions with the financial control
variables for demand, the next two columns refer to the simultaneous estimations with
the financial control variables for usage and the last two columns refer to the simultaneous
estimations with the financial control variables for financial constraints. Again, we
identify the same type of firms that highly rely on a financial function of patents. As
before, SIZE is not significant in the regressions for the patent function "protection against
imitation".
2.6.2 3SLS Estimations
For the analysis of the effect of patents on bank financing and venture capital financing
(Table 2.6 and Table 2.7) we have estimated 2SLS regressions that take account of the
endogeneity of the patenting activity and R&D. Since the errors in the equations may
be correlated, we estimate a system of structural equations to simultaneously account
for endogeneity and potential error correlations between the equations. The three-stage
least-squares estimator of Zellner and Theil (1962) assumes homoscedastic errors that
can be correlated across equations. Table B.5 presents the results. Columns 1a to 1d
present the estimates for the simultaneous regressions of Usage and Demand for both
financial sources with PAT as a measure for patenting activity, Columns 2a to 2d present
the analogue estimates for PAT*VAL. For the 3SLS regressions we cannot include the
equation for Access, since Access is only observed if Demand=1, so that the resulting
covariance matrix of errors would be singular. The significance levels are very similar to
those of the 2SLS regressions. The standard errors are slightly smaller in 3SLS, which
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may be explained by the fact that the standard errors in the 2SLS estimation have been
corrected for heteroscedasticity.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of patents in the financing of start-up firms in the
high-tech and technology-intensive sectors. The theoretical literature on the function of
patents has emphasized that besides the traditional functions, such as protection against
imitation, patents can also play a financial role in terms of improving the access to
external finance. In a first step, we analyze the importance of a financial function in
comparison to the traditional patent functions and identify the types of start-ups that
highly rely on it. In a second step, we investigate whether patents can indeed improve the
access to venture capital and bank finance, using an instrumental-variable approach that
takes into account potential endogeneity and reverse causality. We develop a measure
for access to finance that takes account of firms’ financial demand and considers whether
firms that demand a particular type of financing are successful in obtaining it. To measure
the patenting activity, we use value-weighted patent counts that are based on the direct
valuations by the patent owners.
The analysis of patents in the access to external finance reveals two important findings.
First, we find strong evidence for endogeneity of patenting. Not considering endogeneity
and reverse causality of patenting results in highly biased estimates. Second, our results
indicate that patents significantly increase the probability of using venture capital and
bank financing, in particular when patent values are considered. However, it is not clear
whether an increase in the usage of external finance can be fully attributed to an improved
access to finance or whether part of the increase is due to an increased financial demand
of patenting firms. When we use separate dependent variables for demand and access,
our findings clearly verify a demand side effect. Patenting significantly increases the
probability of demanding venture capital and bank finance, while we cannot prove an
effect of patents on the access to venture capital or bank finance.
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Our findings emphasize the necessity of further research on the financial role of patents
and stress the importance of using precise measures for the access to finance that
control for demand effects and considering potential endogeneity issues of patenting.
Furthermore, larger sample sizes are needed to overcome the small statistical power and
to identify potential effects.
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Chapter 3
Global Investment Decisions and
Patent Protection: Evidence from
German Multinationals
3.1 Introduction
The protection of intellectual property rights has been an important issue on the
international policy agenda. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) has raised the concern in the political and economic debate
that stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) can slow down economic progress in
developing countries by restricting the ability of domestic firms to imitate and benefit
from advanced technologies of foreign firms. However, the proponents of stronger IPR
argue that this disadvantage could be partially offset by benefits that arise from increasing
investments of multinational enterprises. Stronger IPR could encourage multinationals
to expand their scale of operations and increase the local manufacture of technologically
sophisticated goods (Branstetter et al., 2011).
For IPR reforming countries, the question whether a strengthening of local IPR protection
can attract new foreign investors or stimulate the expansion of existing investments is
of high importance for assessing the costs and benefits of IPR reforms. The aim of the
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present paper is therefore to empirically examine the second argument, i.e., whether IPR
protection affects the global investment decisions of multinationals. We thereby focus
on patent law and contribute to a better understanding of how strengthening patent
protection affects inward FDI in reforming countries. Using a firm-level panel dataset
on the universe of German outward FDI, we investigate individual firm-level investment
decisions at the extensive and intensive margins. At the extensive margin, we explore
the impact of patent protection on the decision where to locate a foreign affiliate. At the
intensive margin, we analyze how the strengthening of patent rights affects the size of
foreign affiliates and the ownership share held in these affiliates.
For the analysis, we use rich firm-level panel data of German multinationals and their
foreign affiliates from the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) conducted by the
Deutsche Bundesbank. MiDi is a comprehensive yearly database that gathers location
and balance sheet information on German foreign affiliates and on affiliates of foreign
investors in Germany. By law, German firms are required to report yearly on their
foreign direct investments when particular thresholds regarding ownership participation
and balance sheet totals of foreign affiliates are exceeded. To measure the local strength
of patent protection, we use the Ginarte-Park index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park,
2008). This index approximates the strength of patent protection across 110 countries
between 1960 and 2005. It considers the categories coverage, membership in international
treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms and provisions for loss of patent
protection.
To isolate the effect of patent protection, we exploit variation of patent protection
across countries and time, as well as variation of the dependence on patent protection
across sectors and time. Conditioning on an extensive set of fixed effects, we account
for unobserved firm- and country-specific heterogeneity and capture potential omitted
variable bias. The key explanatory variable is the interaction term between host countries’
patent protection and the sectoral patent dependence of the parent, which allows for
nonlinear effects of patent reforms.
Patent reforms in countries with high initial levels of protection are expected to impose
different effects than patent reforms in countries with weak or no protection. Similarly,
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depending on a country’s previous level of economic development, changes in patent law
could exert different effects. Therefore, we additionally add triple interaction terms that
allow the effect of patent protection to further vary with a country’s pre-reform patent
protection and level of economic development.
Our empirical analysis shows that patent protection affects the foreign investment
decisions of German multinationals in different ways. First, reforms of the patent system
positively affect the location decision of German multinationals. This effect is strongest
for firms in sectors that highly depend on patent protection. Moreover, significant
nonlinear effects in a host country’s initial patent protection and economic development
are found. After strengthening patent protection, countries with an already sufficient
patent protection experience the highest increase in their location advantage. Further,
the results show that countries starting from a low level of economic development also
disproportionately attract FDI by reforming their patent system. Second, regarding
the intensive margin, we find some evidence for a positive effect of patent protection.
However, the effect is much weaker than for the location decision. Given that a foreign
affiliate is established, changes in patent reforms play a minor role on the size of the
affiliate. Third, we find that firms take into account a higher risk of patent infringement
by adapting the capital structure of the foreign affiliate: average ownership shares increase
significantly after strengthening patent protection.
The paper complements the literature on the relation between IPR and FDI. A rich
theoretical literature has investigated the global effect of IPR protection.1 In a seminal
work, Helpman (1993) shows in a dynamic general equilibrium model of two regions, the
innovative North and the imitative South, that the latter never benefits from stronger
IPR protection. Extensions by Lai (1998) and Branstetter et al. (2006), which allow
for endogenous responses in FDI, innovation or imitation activities, provide conditions
under which a strengthening of IPR protection increases the industrial development of
1Branstetter et al. (2011) provide a detailed discussion of the theoretical literature.
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the South. In their models, the total effect depends on whether an increase in northern
FDI compensates for the decrease in southern imitation activities.2
Previous empirical studies on international trade and FDI mainly relied on aggregated
country- or industry-level data and have led to mixed conclusions.3 However, high
correlations between IPR protection and other omitted host country characteristics as well
as no time variation constitute common problems of cross-country studies and provide
explanations for the ambiguous results.
A recently growing empirical literature uses firm-level data to examine how IPR
protection affects the global investment decisions of individual multinationals. The
following recent studies are particularly relevant to this work. Branstetter et al. (2011)
investigate the impact of patent reforms in 16 countries on the investment behavior of
U.S. multinationals and show a positive effect on the intensive margin of FDI, i.e., the
size of foreign affiliates. They find that parents that intensively license technologies
increase their foreign investments disproportionately. Furthermore, using the same
sample, Branstetter et al. (2006) show that patent reforms stimulate the transfer of
technology to reforming countries. Using time- and country-specific variations in the
Ginarte-Park patent index, Bilir (2011) confirms a positive effect of patent protection
on the FDI of U.S. multinationals. She shows that the effect is strongest for firms
that are active in sectors with long product lifecycle lengths and therefore rely more on
patent protection. Javorcik (2004) finds a positive effect of patent protection on FDI in
technologically intensive sectors for transition countries. Moreover, she demonstrates that
strong IPR protection encourages multinational enterprises to invest in local manufacture
rather than in the distribution of goods.
This paper is also related to the literature that examines how political risk in general
influences the capital structure decisions of multinationals. Kesternich and Schnitzer
2In this literature, the South can gain access to new technology through FDI or imitation. Yang
and Maskus (2001a) additionally allow for licensing as a third channel for technology transfer and show
theoretically that stronger IPR can raise technology transfer to the South. Yang and Maskus (2001b)
provide empirical evidence that licensing activities are more likely to take place in countries with strong
IPR protection.
3Maskus (2000) provides a detailed discussion of previous empirical analysis based on aggregated
data. See, e.g., Ferrantino (1993), Lee and Mansfield (1996), Maskus and Penubarti (1995), and Smith
(1999).
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(2010) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that local political risk adversely affects
the capital structure of foreign affiliates in terms of ownership. The optimal ownership
share decreases with higher political risk, since expected returns are reduced, while the
managerial costs of running the affiliate are unaffected.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide a strong
identification strategy that allows for nonlinear effects of patent protection and considers
various sources of omitted variable bias. The identification is based on variation in patent
protection across countries and time as well as on variation in patent sensitivities across
sectors and time. Additionally, we also take into account variation on host countries’
previous levels of legal and economic development, which enables us to draw more precise
policy recommendations for reforming countries. We show that the identified effects of
patent protection are robust to the inclusion of country-time fixed effects, which absorb
all observed and unobserved time-varying country characteristics. Second, the paper
provides a comprehensive analysis of FDI decisions. It decomposes the various levels
of FDI decisions of multinationals, namely decisions on location, size and ownership
structure, something which has been missing in the previous analysis.4 Third, this
paper provides the first firm-level evidence on German multinationals. Insights into how
German multinationals are affected by international patent protection are particularly
interesting because German firms play an important role in international FDI outflows.
With a total FDI outflow of 105 billion USD in 2010, Germany is second largest in the
ranking of FDI outward countries (UNCTAD, 2011). A systematic analysis of German
multinationals has not yet existed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the empirical strategy
and presents the empirical model. Section 3.3 provides a detailed description of the
data sources used in the analysis and presents the descriptive statistics. The results are
discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 reports various robustness checks and Section 3.6
concludes.
4The analysis by Bilir (2011) provides for the first time a joint analysis on the extensive margin
(industry-level) and intensive margin (firm-level) of FDI.
73
Global Investment Decisions and Patent Protection
3.2 Empirical Specification
3.2.1 Identification
The impact of patent protection on foreign direct investment decisions is investigated
along three dimensions: the location decisions of German multinationals, the size of the
investment and the ownership structure. Varieties of the following baseline specification
will be estimated for the different levels of the investment decision.
FDIict = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (3.1)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
where FDIict is a measure of the global investment activity of firm i in country c during
year t, PATc,t−1 captures the patent protection in country c at year t−1, and PATDEPit
represents different sectoral measures of firms’ sensitivity to patent protection.
To establish a causal effect, different potential issues need to be addressed. Most
importantly, one might be concerned that the level of patent protection could be
correlated with unobserved host country characteristics that influence FDI decisions,
which could lead to omitted variable bias. To guard against omitted variable bias,
we condition on an extensive set of fixed effects. Country fixed effects ηc capture
time-invariant country characteristics such as legal origin, language and geography
(including distance and natural resources). These time-constant heterogeneities are
expected to influence foreign direct investment decisions and can simultaneously be
correlated with the level of patent protection. Further, time dummies ηt are included
to absorb the impact of common shocks that affect host countries in a similar manner
over time.
To additionally take into account country-specific dynamics of potential FDI
determinants, various time-varying host country covariates Xc,t−1 are included. We
control for changes in the statutory corporate tax rates, changes in the school system
(approximating human capital; measured by the share of pupils that progress to
secondary school), changes in the GDP per capita (approximating trends in market
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attractiveness), and changes in the host country’s exports (capturing strategic platform
motives). Furthermore, indexes for general rule of law and the overall openness to trade
are included to capture general reforms of the legal system and altering trade barriers.5
All country-specific variables are lagged once.
Moreover, parent fixed effects ηi are included to capture firm-specific heterogeneities,
and in particular unobserved firm-specific differences, such as risk aversion or business
practices, that are expected to strongly correlate with a firm’s investment decisions. Note
that parent fixed effects capture fixed industry-specific differences as well as time constant
ownership links to holding firms. To capture differences in parent-specific time-varying
effects such as different growth rates, we in addition include a parent’s productivity
measured by the logarithm of the ratio of sales over employees.
A further factor that could interfere with identification is the possibility that patent
reforms can be accompanied by simultaneous institutional reforms. Consequently,
changes in FDI behavior following patent reforms would then not be fully attributable
to a better legal protection of patents. Exploiting variation across reforming countries
as well as variation across sectors with varying levels of sensitivity to patent protection
allows to isolate the effect of patent reforms from that of other potentially confounding
factors.6 The index of patent protection is therefore interacted with measures of the
industry-specific dependence on patent protection. Since not all companies rely equally
intensely on patent protection, the influence of patent reforms on a firm’s investment
decision is expected to be heterogeneous.
We explore two different measures that reflect the sensitivity to patent protection: R&D
intensity (R&D) and the perceived effectiveness of patents for protecting inventions
5The corporate tax rate data is taken from various issues of the corporate tax guides
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Coopers&Lybrand, Ernst&Young, and information from the
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). Country data on GDP per capita, the school
system and exports (exports of goods and services as a share of of GDP) are taken from the World Bank
Development Indicator. The indexes on the rule of lae and trade freedom are obtained from the Heritage
Foundation. The definitions of the variables are summarized in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
6This difference-in-difference type approach can be found, e.g., in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Chor
and Manova (2012) and Manova (2013), where interactions between sector-specific measures of financial
vulnerability are used to isolate the effect of country-specific financial development. Bilir (2011) uses
sector-specific variations in product cycle lengths to strengthen the identification of the effect of patent
protection.
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(PATEFF). The industry-specific R&D intensity provides continuous time-varying
approximations for the sensitivity to patent protection at the parent sector-level. A
higher intensity in R&D accompanies a higher rate of innovations, resulting in a greater
need to protect inventions against imitations. To directly measure the dependence on the
patent system, the industry-specific perception of the effectiveness of patent protection is
taken from Cohen et al. (2000). This measure takes into account the relative importance
of patents for protecting inventions compared to other protection strategies, such as
secrecy.7 In the related literature, e.g., measures of industry-specific product cycle lengths
(Bilir, 2011), technology licensing (Branstetter et al., 2011) and patent usage (Branstetter
et al., 2006) have been used to allow for nonlinear effects of patent protection. A detailed
description of the measures can be found in Section 3.3.2.
Furthermore, one would expect the effect of strengthening patent protection to depend
on the initial level of protection. It could make a difference whether a reform takes place
in a country with an already high initial level of patent protection or whether it takes
place in a country with a minimal or no protection. The same applies to different levels
of economic development. An patent reforming country with a very low level of economic
development might not attract FDI in the same manner as a highly developed reforming
country. Triple interaction terms (PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit ∗ Low/High Levelc) allow the
effect to further differ according to whether the country falls in the lowest (highest)
25th percentile of patent protection within all included countries (analogue for GDP per
capita).8
Finally, the main variables of interest are the double and triple interaction terms.
The coefficient of PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit, β2 estimates the effect of changes in host
countries’ strength of patent protection over time on the investment behavior of German
multinationals. β2 is identified from the variation in patent protection across countries,
7The perception-based measure PATEFF is taken from a survey of U.S. manufacturing firms.
This time constant information refers to the year 1994, so before the changes in patent law that
we investigate in this analysis. PATEFF should therefore be clearly exogenous to patent reforms in
particular host countries. The measure of R&D intensity refers to German industries. Thereby, national
and international German firms are considered. The aggregated information on German firms should be
not systematically related to changes in patent protection of particular foreign countries.
8The relative position of a country is determined at the first year of the sample. This avoids that
a country changes its relative position over time due to other countries’ patent reforms or increases in
GDP per capita, without implementing own improvements.
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the variation in patent protection over time within a country, and the variation in patent
sensitivity across and within sectors. The coefficients of the triple interaction terms
are additionally identified from variation in the initial levels of patent protection and
economic development across countries.
3.2.2 Estimating Equations
Location Decision To investigate the location decision of German multinationals, we
follow Javorcik (2004) and inflate the dataset by all observable host countries, such that
each parent firm could have invested in each host country within each time period. The
number of observations equals the number of parents times the number of host countries
in each year. The binary variable yict equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host country
c in year t. We specify the following linear probability model
Pr(yict = 1) = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (3.2)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
where ηi captures parent fixed effects that account for time-invariant firm-specific
characteristics, ηc time-constant host country fixed effects and ηt year fixed effects. The
vector Xc,t−1 summarizes time-varying host country covariates (lagged once), Yi,t the
time-varying parent-level controls.
A linear probability model has the advantage of not requiring a distributional assumption
regarding the firm-specific unobserved effects ηi. An independence assumption on the
responses (yic1,...,yicT ) conditional on the explanatory variables and the unobserved effect
is further not necessary (Wooldridge, 2010). Since the identification is based on an
extensive set of fixed effects, many dummies have to be included in the regression. In
maximum likelihood estimations of nonlinear models this could introduce an incidental
parameters problem, which can result in inconsistent estimations of all coefficients, while
in linear regression models the slope estimator is unbiased and consistent (Greene, 2008,
p.587). Therefore, a linear probability model is preferable in this setting. Furthermore,
linear probability models allow to directly interpret the marginal effects of the interaction
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terms, which are of main interest in this study.9 In a robustness check, the location
decision is re-estimated with nonlinear fixed effects models. Standard errors are clustered
on the parent-level to account for heteroskedasticity and serial dependence in the
firm-level panel data.10
Size of Investment For the intensive margin of FDI, we investigate how patent
protection influences the size of foreign affiliates, given that a multinational has invested
in a specific country. The basic specification takes the form
Sizeijt = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (3.3)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict,
where i indexes the parent, j the foreign affiliate, c the country and t the year.
The variable Sizeijt contains the alternative size measures Log(FDI), Log(Sales) and
Log(Employees). In all specifications, we include dummies for the affiliate age and
sector.11
Ownership Structure In the global investment decision of multinationals, the
influence of patent protection on the composition of the FDI is of particular interest.
Multinational firms can adapt the ownership structure of their foreign affiliates to respond
to country specific risks that affect the expected profitability of their investments. We
estimate
Ownershipijt = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t + Zijct (3.4)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
where Ownershipijt is the share of the affiliate’s equity held by the German parent. The
vector Zijct captures time-varying affiliate characteristics that are expected to influence
9This is not straightforward in nonlinear models, see Ai and Norton (2003) for a detailed discussion.
10Clustering on country-level does not affect the results of the key variables concerning patent
protection and leads to the same conclusions.
11Unfortunately, direct information on the year of foundation is not available. Instead, we approximate
an affiliate’s age with the number of years since the affiliate has entered the dataset.
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the ownership structure. Following Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010), we include an
affiliate’s fixed over total assets, log(sales), and profits over total assets as additional
control variables. Further, dummies for an affiliate’s sector and age are included.
3.3 Data
The empirical analysis requires a time-varying measure of patent protection that ideally
covers all potential host countries, proxies for the sectors’ sensitivity to patent protection,
and detailed firm-level data on multinational activities across countries and time. In the
following, the data sources used are described in detail and the descriptive statistics are
presented.
3.3.1 Patent Protection Across Countries
Ginarte and Park (1997) provide an index of patent protection, which has been widely
used in the literature.12 That index has been updated by Park (2008) and covers
110 countries for 1960-2005, surveyed every five years. It documents the strength of
patent rights in five categories: extent of coverage, membership in international patent
agreements, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and provisions for loss of
patent protection. The categories are scored with values ranging from 0 to 1 and an
unweighted sum is constructed, so that the index varies between 0 and 5 (for details, see
Park, 2008; Ginarte and Park, 1997).
Table C.2 in Appendix C summarizes the patent protection across the host countries
in the sample for 1996-2006. Across countries, the average patent protection varies
between 1.41 (Guyana) and 4.88 (USA). Between the years 1996 and 2006, many countries
introduced a minimum protection level or strengthened their existing patent laws, such
that the global average protection level increased over time from 2.78 to 3.57. In the
entire panel the index has a mean of 3.24 and a standard deviation of 1.03.
12See, e.g., Kumar (2001), Javorcik (2004), Branstetter et al. (2006), Falvey et al. (2006), Qian (2007)
and Bilir (2011).
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For robustness, we also use a perception-based measure of IPR protection provided by
the World Economic Forum. This measure is available for 98 countries with yearly values
for 2005-2009. A potential disadvantage of this measure is that it covers a relative short
time period and does not include observations from the 90s, when major reforms took
place (see Section 3.5.3).
3.3.2 Sensitivity to Patent Protection Across Sectors
Two different measures for a firm’s sensitivity to patent protection are explored. First,
information on the R&D intensity is taken from the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW). The measure is based on the proportion of expenditures for innovation
over total sales and provides a continuous time-varying measure of the R&D intensities
of German industries. Firms in industries with high R&D intensities exhibit, on average,
a higher rate of innovation, which goes along with a greater need to protect inventions
against imitations.
Second, a perception-based measure of the dependence on patent protection is taken from
the survey of Cohen et al. (2000). This survey is based on a sample of U.S. manufacturing
firms for the year 1994, in which firms were asked how effective they perceived patents to
be at protecting their innovation. The important difference with regard to R&D intensity
is that some industries, depending on the type of invention, more often prefer not to file
a patent application and thereby disclose sensitive information, but to strategically keep
inventions secret. However, it has to be assumed that the perceptions of firms from the
respective German sector are sufficiently correlated and that the ranking across sectors is
relatively stable over time. Otherwise the measure would contain a lot of noise or even no
information and the estimated coefficient would be biased towards zero. The measures
for the sensitivity to patent protection for the 29 included industries (mainly matched at
the 2-digit level of the NACE 1 industry code) are listed in Table C.3 in Appendix C.
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3.3.3 German Outward FDI
The analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank). It constitutes a comprehensive dataset,
since German parents are required by law to report on their foreign investments if certain
thresholds on balance-sheet totals and ownership shares are exceeded (Lipponer, 2006).
For this research yearly firm-level panel data on German multinationals and their foreign
affiliates for the years 1996-2010 were used.
The research interest lies in direct outward FDI, such that observations on outward
FDI that constitute ownership chains of dependent affiliates are excluded. Reporting
thresholds have been changed several times during the covered time period, influencing
the composition of the sampled firms. To harmonize the sample between years, the
strictest reporting threshold is considered, such that only parents with a participation
share of at least 50 percent and a balance sheet total of 3 million EUR are included.13
Furthermore, the analysis concentrates on parents from manufacturing sectors, since
information on patent sensitivity is mainly available for these sectors. Since the patent
protection index is available in five-year intervals, data can be matched for the years 1996,
2001 and 2006. Thereby, 84 of 138 destination countries for German multinational can
be matched, covering 89 percent of total outward FDI of the considered multinationals in
the sampled years. The final sample comprises 2,726 individual German parents which
hold in total 12,152 foreign affiliates in 84 different destination countries (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables.
Table 3.1: Sample characteristics
Year # Parents # Affiliates # Destinations
1996 1,342 2,954 39
2001 1,781 4,689 67
2006 1,509 4,509 74
Total 2,726 12,152 84
13Before 1999, the reporting threshold was an ownership share of more than 20 percent and a balance
sheet total of more than 1 million DM, for 1999-2002 an ownership share of 50 percent or more and a
balance sheet total of more than 1 million DM (10-50 percent for more than 10 million DM) and since
2002 an ownership share of 10 percent or more and a balance sheet total of more than 3 million EUR.
See Lipponer (2006) for more details.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St Dev Min Max
Parent-level
Productivity 5.78 1.34 0.79 12.71
R&D 3.52 2.41 0.35 8.96
PATEFF 34.96 9.03 12.08 50.20
Affiliate-level
Ownership 0.93 0.15 0.50 1.00
Log(Sales) 7.99 4.78 -4.60 16.33
Log(FDI) 8.69 1.46 0.15 17.08
Log(Employees) 3.21 3.04 -4.60 11.22
Fixed/Total Assets 0.24 0.25 0.00 1.00
Profitability 0.04 0.14 -1.42 1.18
Country-level
PAT 3.27 0.99 0.00 4.88
Log(GDPpc) 8.14 1.60 4.16 11.30
Corporate Tax 29.92 8.75 0 60
Schooling 33.81 23.02 0.46 93.49
Exports 43.64 29.69 7.26 229.68
Rule of Law 55.22 22.63 10 90
Trade Openness 66.20 14.68 0 90
Notes: All min (max) values refer to averages of the three smallest (largest)
firms. The number of firms for the smallest (largest) category is increased,
if the standard devition is equal to zero for the three firms. The definitions
of the variables are summarized in Table C.1.
Figure 3.1 presents scatter plots for the dependent variables.14 The first graph illustrates
the relation between patent protection and the logarithm of the number of German
affiliates in a host country. There is a positive and convex relation. The better the
patent protection, the more German affiliates are localized in a host country. The
next three graphs present how the mean of the size measures Log(Sales), Log(FDI) and
Log(Employees) varies with patent protection. Countries with a better patent protection
host on average larger affiliates with higher sales amounts. With regard to the number of
employees, no clear relation appears. The last graph presents the relation between average
ownership shares of foreign affiliates and patent protection. Although high ownership
shares can be found in countries at all levels of patent protection, the highest values are
14Due to the confidentiality of the data, only information on host countries with affiliates from at
least three different parent firms are used for the graphs.
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Figure 3.1: Scatter plots of the dependent variables
concentrated in countries with strong protection. To study the above observed patterns
more precisely, multivariate regressions are presented in the following.
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3.4 Results
The aim of the analysis is to investigate the effect of patent protection on various
dimensions of FDI. This section presents the multivariate regressions on the decision
where to locate a foreign affiliate and, given that an affiliate has been established, the
decisions how much to invest, and how to set the ownership share of the affiliate.
3.4.1 Location Decision
Table 3.3 presents the results for the location decision. The coefficient of PAT in the
specification without interactions (Column 1) is positive and significant. A strengthening
of patent protection by one standard deviation (1.03) is associated with an on average
1.25 percentage points higher probability of locating a foreign affiliate. Furthermore,
GDP per capita, the quality of the schooling system, the connectedness to the world (in
terms of exports) and higher trade freedom are also found to significantly attract German
FDI, while a higher tax rate reduces the probability of affiliate location.
Since identification is stronger when allowing for nonlinear effects of patent protection,
Columns 2 and 3 present interactions between PAT and the measures of patent sensitivity.
Both coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly positive and indicate a
strong nonlinear relation that increases with the industry-specific sensitivity for patent
protection. An increase in patent protection by one standard deviation increases the
probability of having located a foreign affiliate by 1.80 percentage points (with PATEFF)
and 0.73 percentage points (with R&D) for an average firm. The direct measure of patent
sensitivity quantifies a stronger effect of patent protections.
With regard to the parent explanatory variables, we find that a higher productivity of the
parent increases the general probability of FDI. This is in line with theoretical predictions
that a productivity cut off exists.15 Further, firms active in industries with high R&D
intensities generally less often invest abroad.16
15See, e.g., Melitz (2003) for the role of firm productivity in international trade and Helpman et al.
(2004) for FDI and exports.
16Note, that the measure PATEFF is time invariant and is therefore captured in the parent FE effect.
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Table 3.3: Location decision
Dependent variable: Location
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Corporate Tax -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exports 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Rule of Law -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Trade Openness 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT 0.0121∗∗∗ -0.0039 0.0036
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0025)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PAT*R&D 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0004)
R&D -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0018)
Observations 284523 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2726 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1897 0.1944 0.1929
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **,
* denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The
dependent variable is the binary location variable yict that equals 1 if
parent i holds an affiliate in host country c in year t. All specifications
include country, year and parent fixed effects.
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Table 3.4 summarizes the results for the triple interactions that allow the effect of patent
reforms to further vary with a country’s initial level of patent protection or economic
development. The elasticity to patent reforms significantly differs with the initial level
of patent protection. Reforming countries with an already high patent protection level
(upper 25 percentile) are able to attract more FDI than countries with a low or middle
level of protection. With regard to the initial level of economic development, we observe a
U-shaped relation. The previously observed pattern that more patent sensitive firms have
a higher elasticity to patent reforms remains robust in all specifications. In comparison to
countries with an average initial development level (25 to 75 percentile), we find additional
positive effects of strengthening patent protection for low developed countries (lowest 25
percentile) as well as for high developed countries.
3.4.2 Size of Investment
The estimations for the size measures Log(FDI), Log(Sales) and Log(Employees) are
summarized in Table 3.5. Regarding patent protection, the results for the intensive
margins of FDI are much weaker than for the extensive margin. In the baseline regressions
without interaction terms (Columns 1, 4 and 7) a significant positive effect of patent
protection is found for affiliate’s sales and employees. When including interaction terms
between PAT and patent sensitivity, a significant effect is found with PATEFF for
Log(FDI), while the coefficients in the other specifications are not significant. Taken
together with the previous results, this suggests that patent protection plays a major
role for the location decision, while, given that a multinational has established a foreign
affiliate, it seems to play a minor role for the scope of the investment.
Instead, the most important determinant for the intensive margin of FDI is GDP per
capita. Given that a firm is located in a specific host country, raises in the GDP per
capita significantly increase affiliate size. A host country’s tax rates and schooling system
are not found to influence an affiliate’s size. Similar to PAT, these determinants are found
to have major importance for the location decision, but given location, they seem not
to influence the decision on the size of the investment. Interestingly, exports are found
to have a significant and positive effect on the number of employees, such that platform
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Table 3.4: Location decision with heterogeneity in initial host country characteristics
Dependent variable: Location
Triple interaction with: Initial PAT Initial GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Corporate Tax -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exports 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Property Rights -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Trade Openness 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗ 0.0040∗
(0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0001 0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT*PATEFF*Low Level 0.0000 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT*PATEFF*High Level 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT*R&D 0.0009∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
PAT*R&D*Low Level 0.0003∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
PAT*R&D*High Level 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
R&D -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017)
Observations 261434 275373 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2490 2630 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1949 0.1931 0.1951 0.1933
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the
binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host country
c in year t. All specifications include country, year and parent fixed effects.
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motives are found to influence the extensive and intensive margins of FDI. However,
with regard to Log(Sales) or Log(FDI), no such relation is found. Better terms of trade
freedom are associated with higher FDI and more employees in foreign affiliates. Rule of
law has a significant negative, but small effect. However, identification in the fixed effect
model is based on time variation and since rule of law does not change much over time,
this could explain the contradictory results.
3.4.3 Ownership Structure
The analysis on how the capital structure in terms of ownership share reacts to changes
in patent protection is presented in Table 3.6. A lack of patent protection goes along
with a higher risk of patent infringements and can be seen as a form of political risk. An
increase in patent protection, which is associated with a reduction in political risk, leads
to an overall increase in the ownership shares of foreign affiliates held by German parents.
This confirms the results of Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) that provide evidence that
multinationals adapt the capital structure of their foreign affiliates with respect to local
political risk and reduce their ownership shares in high-risk host countries. The results
extend the literature by providing first empirical evidence for political risk in terms of
patent infringement.
However, the nonlinear effects of patent sensitivity, which would provide a more reliable
identification, are not significantly different from zero. One limitation of the analysis that
might affect the results is that much variation of the ownership structure is not captured,
since only firms with participation shares above the required threshold are required to
report on their FDI.17
17In an alternative estimation, we ignored the harmonization problem of our sample and estimated
the determinants of the ownership share with all available observations of foreign affiliates. However,
the results did not change.
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Table 3.6: Ownership share of foreign affiliates
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity -0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0013
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Log(Sales) 0.0032 0.0038 0.0032
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Profitability -0.0286∗ -0.0241 -0.0298∗
(0.0160) (0.0178) (0.0163)
Fix/Total Assets -0.0149 -0.0148 -0.0140
(0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0156)
Log(GDPpc) -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0191
(0.0146) (0.0153) (0.0146)
Corporate Tax -0.0012∗ -0.0012 -0.0012∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Schooling -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Exports -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Rule of Law -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade Openness 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
PAT 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0128)
PAT*PATEFF -0.0001
(0.0002)
PAT*R&D -0.0007
(0.0024)
R&D 0.0069
(0.0112)
Observations 11187 10330 10904
Indiv. Parents 2615 2393 2525
Destinations 73 72 73
Adjusted R2 0.3148 0.3137 0.3164
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***,
**, * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
All specifications include country, year and parent fixed effects.
Additionally, dummies for an affiliate’s age and sector are included.
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3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
3.5.1 Estimation with Country-Year Fixed Effects
To rule out that other changes in a country beyond patent protection are influencing the
results, we include time-varying country-year fixed effects. These fixed effects capture all
observable and unobservable time-varying components and control for potential omitted
time-varying factors at the country level. All changes in the country-specific explanatory
variables are adsorbed, including changes in patent protection, such that only the
coefficient on the interaction between patent protection and patent sensitivity can be
identified in these specifications. Table C.4 to C.6 present the results for location, size
and ownership. The results for the interaction terms remain very robust and strengthen
our previous findings in the basis estimations. These findings indicate, that no omitted
time-varying factors interfere with the estimated effect of patent protection.
3.5.2 Identification of Patent Reforms
To strengthen the identification, different measures of the sensitivity to patent protection
have been interacted with PAT, which allows for nonlinear effects of patent protection
and provides additional industry-level variation. A concern might still be that the
estimated effects could capture reforms of general legal institutions. To verify whether
the methodology identifies the effects of changes in patent law alone, we carry out a
falsification test and interact PAT with a measure of the industry-specific importance of
secrecy for protecting inventions.
Similarly to patent sensitivity, a measure of the effectiveness of secrecy is expected to
be positively correlated with industry-specific technological complexity. Yet, additional
variation occurs due to industry-specific differences in the patentability of inventions
and business practices in protecting innovations. Depending on the type of invention,
keeping an invention secret could be preferable to filing a patent and thereby disclosing
sensitive information. Most importantly, the degree of reliance on secrecy should not
directly depend on formal patent law, which provides no protection for secrecy. If the
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effect of PAT is correctly identified from changes in patent law alone, the coefficient of
an interaction term between secrecy and PAT should be insignificant. By contrast, a
significant coefficient would indicate that changes in general legal institutions are not
disentangled and could influence the results.18
Table C.7 in Appendix C summarizes the estimations for all FDI dimensions with an
interaction term between PAT and a measure of secrecy, which is also taken from
the survey of Cohen et al. (2000). Firms that greatly rely on secrecy as a protection
strategy do not change their investment behavior due to changes in patent law. For the
location decision, where patent protection was found to play the most important role,
the interaction term is not significant. Similarly, for all size specifications, no significant
effect is found. Only in the ownership regression a weakly significant (at the ten percent
level) coefficient is found for the interaction term, indicating that after a reduction of
political risk in the form of PAT infringement, parents with a high sensitivity for secrecy
increase their ownership share in their affiliates.
3.5.3 Alternative Measurement of IPR Protection
A concern regarding the Ginarte-Park patent protection index may be that it covers
mainly law on the books and does not fully capture the de facto strength of enforcement.19
To account for that potential limitation, we estimate the basis regressions with a
perception-based measure of IPR protection (PERC-IPR). This index is provided by the
World Economic Forum and is available for 98 countries with yearly values for 2005-2009.
It assesses the overall strength of IPR protection at a scale from 1 to 7, with higher values
indicating better protection. The index considers patent, copyright and trademark law
and is much broader than the Ginarte-Park index, which focuses on patent rights. It has
the advantage that it also captures problems in the enforcement of law. A disadvantage of
this index is, however, that it covers a relatively short time period that does not include
18An alternative explanation for a significant effect could also be that secrecy is, due to the expected
correlation with technological complexity, highly correlated with patent sensitivity. However, this would
work against the falsification test.
19However, enforcement mechanism on the books are considered in the Ginarte-Park index.
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observations from the 90s. Consequently, important variation is missing, which could
weaken the identification.
Appendix Tables C.8 - C.10 replicate the baseline results with the perception-based IPR
index. The underlying firm-level sample covers the years 2006-2010, since the host country
variables are lagged once. In the location decision, the results for PERC-IPR are similar
to the estimations with the Ginarte-Park index. The coefficients of the interaction terms
between PERC-IPR and the patent sensitivity measures are positive and significant. In
the size regressions, the coefficients of PERC-IPR and its interaction terms are, similar
to the estimations with the Ginarte-Park index, mainly not significant. For ownership,
the general positive effect of patent protection is confirmed only in the specification with
the interaction between PERC-IPR and R&D. However, the effect is smaller for R&D
intensive firms. The net effect after an increase in the PERC-IPR index by one unit
is an increase of 0.75 percentage points in the ownership share for the average parent.
R&D intensive firms seem to be more cautious in increasing their ownership shares after
a strengthening of IPR protection.
3.5.4 Nonlinear Estimation of the Location Decision
In the baseline specification, the location decision is estimated with a linear probability
model. This has the advantage that no additional assumptions regarding the unobserved
effect ηi and the responses (yic1,...,yicT ) are necessary and an incidental parameter problem
that can occur in a maximum likelihood estimation with an extensive set of dummy
variables is avoided. However, as a robustness check, the location decision is re-estimated
with a nonlinear conditional logit model, which takes into account the binary nature of
the dependent variable. Table C.11 summarizes the results, whereby estimations without
country fixed effects (Columns 1-3) and with country fixed effects (Columns 4-6) are
presented to assess the severity of any potential incidental parameter problem.
In the specifications without country fixed effects, strengthening patent protection has
a positive and significant effect on the probability of locating a foreign affiliate in a
reforming country. In contrast to the linear probability estimations (see Table 3.3), the
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coefficients of PAT remain positive and significant when interaction terms are included.
For all interaction terms, we find positive effects. In the specifications with country fixed
effects, we find a positive effect of PAT in the basic specification without interaction
terms and a significant positive effect for the interaction with patent effectiveness.
Comparing the results for the host country controls reveals how important country fixed
effects are for the identification, since many coefficients change sign when country fixed
effects are included. Since the incidental parameter problem is very likely with the
extensive set of fixed effects, our preferred estimation model is the linear probability
model.
3.6 Conclusions
The present paper analyzes how national patent protection influences various levels in the
global investment decisions of German multinationals. In particular, we show that patent
protection is a significant factor in attracting technologically sophisticated FDI, since
strengthening patent protection increases the probability of locating a foreign affiliate in
a reforming country, especially so for R&D intensive and firms that are sensitive to patent
protection. This has important policy implications for host countries, as the attraction
of FDI can contribute to technology spillovers and foster domestic growth.
Moreover, we show that the effect of patent reforms differs with a host country’s
pre-reform characteristics. With regard to the initial level of patent protection, we find
the strongest effects for countries with an already sufficient pre-reform patent protection.
Evidence that a too high patent protection could distort FDI has not been found. With
regard to the initial level of economic development, we find the effect of patent reforms is
significantly positive at all stages of economic development. However, reforming countries
with a relatively high level of economic development exhibit stronger effects of legal
reforms and are hence able to attract FDI more successfully than countries with an
average economic development. For less developed countries, also disproportional positive
effects of patent protection are found. How the effect of patent reforms interacts with
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pre-reform country characteristics should be of interest for policy makers that need to
forecast future FDI inflows to be able to assess the benefits of patent reforms.
Regarding the size of a foreign affiliate, we identify circumstances under which patent
reforms significantly increase the size of affiliates. However, the results are much weaker
than for the location decision. Given that an affiliate is established in a country, the effect
of patent protection is found to play a minor role for the size of an investment. For the
capital structure of multinational firms, we find that a stronger patent protection results
in higher ownership shares held by the German parent. This is an important finding, since
a higher share of ownership is associated with lower agency costs and higher incentives
to transfer technology.
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Table A.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Firm-level
Age 0-7 Firm has been established after transition (after 1998). BEEPS 2005 (s1a)
Age 14+ Firm has been established before transition (before 1991). BEEPS 2005 (s1a)
Foreign Largest shareholder is a foreign company. BEEPS 2005 (q4aa)
Privatized Firm has been established through privatization of a state-owned firm. BEEPS
2005 (q5a)
State-owned Legal status of company is either state/ municipal/ district-owned, corporatised
state-owned or other state-owned enterprise. BEEPS 2005 (s2a)
Small Firm has less than 50 employees. BEEPS 2005 (s4b)
Transparency Following Brown et al. (2009) this variable is based on the usage of international
accounting standards (q48) and external auditors. It equals 0 if the firm does
not use international accounting standards or external auditors, 1 if the firms
uses one of the two and 2 if both are used. BEEPS 2005 (q48, q49)
Profits Firm has realized positive profits in 2003. BEEPS 2005 (q59b)
Capacity Output in comparison with the maximum output possible. BEEPS (q65a1)
Perceived Competition Firms are asked to answer the hypothetical question, how customers would
react if the firm raised the price of the main product or service by ten percent.
It varies from 1 (customer would continue to buy) to 4 (many of the costumers
would buy from competitors instead). BEEPS 2005 (q11)
Investment Firm has acquired new production technology over the last 36 months. BEEPS
2005 (q61a)
Sector dummies More than 50 percent of the sales of a company comes from this sector. The
majority of the firms operates in a single sector. The sectors are mining
and quarrying (sector 1), construction (sector 2), manufacturing (sector 3),
wholesale, retail and repairs (sector 4), real estate, renting and business services
(sector 5), hotels and restaurants (sector 6) and others (sector 7).
Country-level
Log(GDPpc) Logarithm of GDP per capita (current US$). Average values for the years
2001-2003. Source: World Bank
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual percentage). Average values for the years
2001-2003. Source: World Bank
Foreign Bank Assets Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in percentage). Average values for the
years 2001-2003. Source: EBRD (2005b)
Creditor Rights The index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect
the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. 2005 value
(earlier values not available). Source: World Bank: Doing Business, Getting
Credit
Enforcement Logarithm of time (in days) to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment
the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the
days when actions take place and the waiting periods in between. 2005 values
(earlier values not available). Source: World Bank, Doing Business, Enforcing
Contracts
Information Sharing Based on information from the Doing Business in 2006 report (World Bank,
2006), Brown et al. (2009b) compute for each country and year one index
for private credit bureaus and one for public credit registries that account for
the existence and coverage of these institutions. The maximum value of both
indexes is taken to approximate the level of information sharing. Average values
for the years 2001-2003. Source: Brown et al. (2009b)
Bank Concentration Assets of the three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks.
Average values for the years 2001-2003. Source: Beck et al. (2010)
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Table A.2: Alternative exclusion restrictions
Instruments: Perceived Competition Instruments: Perceived Competition and Subsidy
Access Demand Access Demand Access Demand Access Demand
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Age 0-7 -0.036*** 0.028 -0.036*** 0.026 -0.035*** 0.029 -0.035*** 0.027
(0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018)
Age 14+ -0.023 0.007 -0.024 0.017 -0.022 0.007 -0.023 0.016
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Foreign 0.044* -0.125*** 0.039 -0.128*** 0.045* -0.124*** 0.041* -0.127***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026)
State-owned -0.060 -0.169*** -0.065 -0.177*** -0.055 -0.188*** -0.055 -0.199***
(0.048) (0.038) (0.058) (0.038) (0.046) (0.036) (0.047) (0.037)
Privatized 0.009 -0.002 0.026 0.009 0.009 -0.001 0.026 0.008
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Small -0.142*** -0.070*** -0.140*** -0.063*** -0.138*** -0.067*** -0.134*** -0.059***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.031) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Transparency 0.068*** 0.025*** 0.071*** 0.031*** 0.067*** 0.024*** 0.067*** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Profits 0.122*** -0.014 0.111*** -0.027 0.120*** -0.011 0.107*** -0.023
(0.026) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020)
Capacity 0.001** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.002*** 0.001** -0.002*** 0.001** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sector 2 0.061 -0.149** 0.049 -0.139** 0.062 -0.148** 0.051 -0.136**
(0.060) (0.067) (0.063) (0.066) (0.058) (0.069) (0.059) (0.068)
Sector 3 0.064 -0.112* 0.047 -0.119** 0.065 -0.113* 0.049 -0.119*
(0.064) (0.061) (0.067) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.062)
Sector 4 0.078 -0.192*** 0.073 -0.181*** 0.079 -0.190*** 0.074 -0.176***
(0.052) (0.064) (0.053) (0.063) (0.051) (0.066) (0.051) (0.064)
Sector 5 0.059 -0.295*** 0.063 -0.280*** 0.063 -0.294*** 0.069 -0.276***
(0.058) (0.076) (0.056) (0.074) (0.055) (0.079) (0.051) (0.077)
Sector 6 0.096** -0.318*** 0.101** -0.307*** 0.098** -0.314*** 0.103** -0.298***
(0.045) (0.058) (0.045) (0.057) (0.043) (0.060) (0.042) (0.058)
Sector 7 0.041 -0.195*** 0.036 -0.184*** 0.043 -0.200*** 0.040 -0.187**
(0.060) (0.072) (0.061) (0.071) (0.057) (0.076) (0.056) (0.073)
Log(GDPpc) -0.012 -0.030 -0.010 -0.034
(0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026)
Inflation 0.000 0.003** 0.000 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Banks 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Creditor Rights 0.012 0.003 0.011* 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Information Sharing 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Enforcement 0.064 0.021 0.061 0.021
(0.046) (0.053) (0.045) (0.051)
Bank Concentration -0.109 -0.046 -0.104 -0.039
(0.100) (0.112) (0.091) (0.110)
Perceived Competition 0.020*** 0.020** 0.020*** 0.020**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Subsidy 0.102*** 0.121***
(0.025) (0.022)
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5689 5689 5689 5689
ρ -0.716*** -0.702 -0.759*** -0.789***
pρ 0.005 0.138 0.000 0.002
Notes: The table presents marginal effects evaluated at the mean from probit regressions with sample selection. The dependent
variable in the outcome regression is access to credit, while demand for credit is the dependent variable in the selection equation.
Standard errors are clustered on country-level and are reported in parenthesis. In the first two specifications, the instrument in
the selection equations is perceived competition. In the last two specifications we follow Popov and Udell (2012) and use perceived
competition and subsidy as instruments. Sector coding: 1 mining and quarrying, 2 construction, 3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale,
retail and repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services, 6 hotel and restaurants, 7 others. The left out category for age is
age 8-13 (firms founded during transition), for nationality privately-owned firms and mining and quarrying for sectors. ρ is the
correlation between the error terms. ***, **, * denote that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05
and 0.10 level.
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Table A.3: Heckman two-step estimator
Access Demand Access Demand
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Age 0-7 -0.064*** 0.029* -0.061*** 0.026*
(0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
Age 14+ -0.029 0.007 -0.034 0.015
(0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016)
Foreign 0.117** -0.128*** 0.093** -0.129***
(0.048) (0.025) (0.046) (0.024)
State-owned 0.033 -0.165*** 0.001 -0.170***
(0.061) (0.029) (0.061) (0.029)
Privatized 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.011
(0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Small -0.135*** -0.069*** -0.150*** -0.060***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
Transparency 0.068*** 0.021* 0.074*** 0.029***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
Profits 0.156*** -0.022 0.148*** -0.033*
(0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018)
Capacity 0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Sector 2 0.137 -0.145* 0.107 -0.137*
(0.095) (0.084) (0.088) (0.082)
Sector 3 0.113 -0.110 0.094 -0.118
(0.090) (0.075) (0.084) (0.074)
Sector 4 0.175* -0.181** 0.151* -0.173**
(0.096) (0.080) (0.090) (0.079)
Sector 5 0.211* -0.283*** 0.181* -0.271***
(0.115) (0.084) (0.109) (0.083)
Sector 6 0.294** -0.308*** 0.264** -0.299***
(0.122) (0.084) (0.117) (0.084)
Sector 7 0.130 -0.188** 0.106 -0.180**
(0.099) (0.083) (0.092) (0.082)
Investment 0.042*** 0.035**
(0.014) (0.014)
Perceived Competition 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006)
Log(GDPpc) -0.006 -0.028**
(0.019) (0.013)
Inflation -0.000 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Banks 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Creditor Rights 0.013** 0.004
(0.006) (0.004)
Information Sharing 0.008 0.009**
(0.007) (0.005)
Enforcement 0.073** 0.015
(0.030) (0.023)
Bank Concentration -0.113 -0.052
(0.069) (0.052)
Country FE Yes No
Constant Yes Yes
R-squared
Number of Observations 5689 5689
Inverse Mills’ Ratio -0.607*** -0.499***
Notes: The table presents marginal effects evaluated at the mean from the
Heckman two-step estimation for access to credit. The dependent variable
in the outcome regression is access to credit, while demand for credit is
the dependent variable in the selection equation. Standard errors are
clustered on country-level and are reported in parenthesis. Sector coding:
1 mining and quarrying, 2 construction, 3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale,
retail and repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services, 6 hotel
and restaurants, 7 others. The left out category for age is age 8-13
(firms founded during transition), for nationality privately-owned firms
and mining and quarrying for sectors. ***, **, * denote that the marginal
effect is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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Table A.4: Standard errors clustered on industry-country-level
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit with Selection Probit with Selection
Usage Usage Access Access Access Demand Access Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Age 0-7 -0.013 -0.016 -0.040** -0.042** -0.035*** 0.031* -0.035*** 0.028*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017)
Age 14+ -0.012 -0.007 -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 0.007 -0.023* 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017)
Foreign -0.096*** -0.098*** 0.019 0.015 0.046** -0.125*** 0.041* -0.128***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
State-owned -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.150*** -0.154*** -0.051 -0.163*** -0.054 -0.173***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.049) (0.047) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Privatized 0.003 0.031 0.009 0.037 0.009 0.002 0.025 0.011
(0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Small -0.206*** -0.191*** -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.136*** -0.063*** -0.132*** -0.056***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021)
Transparency 0.082*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.066*** 0.022* 0.066*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Profits 0.096*** 0.075*** 0.154*** 0.136*** 0.118*** -0.020 0.106*** -0.033*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
Capacity -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.002*** 0.001** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sector 2 -0.034 -0.035 0.056 0.043 0.062 -0.155** 0.050 -0.142**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) (0.054) (0.067) (0.057) (0.070)
Sector 3 -0.016 -0.033 0.066 0.041 0.064 -0.122** 0.047 -0.126*
(0.079) (0.082) (0.085) (0.089) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063) (0.064)
Sector 4 -0.058 -0.052 0.067 0.064 0.079 -0.190*** 0.073 -0.177***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.082) (0.054) (0.064) (0.055) (0.067)
Sector 5 -0.170** -0.157** 0.004 0.016 0.063 -0.295*** 0.068 -0.277***
(0.072) (0.077) (0.088) (0.089) (0.054) (0.067) (0.053) (0.073)
Sector 6 -0.149* -0.139 0.062 0.074 0.098** -0.315*** 0.102** -0.301***
(0.082) (0.085) (0.081) (0.082) (0.043) (0.071) (0.043) (0.076)
Sector 7 -0.098 -0.091 0.011 0.008 0.044 -0.198*** 0.039 -0.184***
(0.076) (0.078) (0.085) (0.088) (0.057) (0.066) (0.058) (0.069)
Log(GDPpc) -0.036 -0.025 -0.011 -0.028
(0.028) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020)
Inflation 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Banks 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Creditor Rights 0.015** 0.017** 0.011** 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Information Sharing 0.017* 0.014 0.008 0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Enforcement 0.073 0.092 0.060* 0.018
(0.057) (0.057) (0.034) (0.037)
Bank Concentration -0.149 -0.158 -0.104 -0.054
(0.134) (0.122) (0.070) (0.092)
Investment 0.055*** 0.047***
(0.013) (0.014)
Perceived Competition 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006)
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.086 0.060 0.132 0.102
Number of Observations 5689 5689 3859 3859 5689 5689
ρ -0.784*** -0.803***
Notes: The table presents the marginal effects evaluated at the mean from the regressions of usage of credit (column 1-2) and access
to credit (column 3-6). Standard errors are clustered on industry-country-level and are reported in parenthesis. Sector coding: 1
mining and quarrying, 2 construction, 3 manufacturing, 4 wholesale, retail and repairs, 5 real estate, renting and business services,
6 hotel and restaurants, 7 others. The left out category for age is age 8-13 (firms founded during transition), for nationality
privately-owned firms and mining and quarrying for sectors. The correlation between the error terms ρ is indirectly estimated
through atanh ρ. ***, **, * denote that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.1: Industry classifications within industry groups
Industry group WZ2008 industry code
Superior technology manufacturing 20.20, 21.10, 21.20, 24.46, 25.40, 26.11, 26.20,
26.30, 26.40, 26.51, 26.60, 30.30, 30.40, 32.50
High technology manufacturing 20.13, 20.14, 20.16, 20.17, 20.41, 20.51, 20.53,
20.59, 22.11, 22.19, 23.19, 26.70, 27.11, 27.12,
27.20, 27.40, 27.90, 28.11, 28.23, 28.24, 28.29,
28.30, 28.41, 28.49, 28.92, 28.99, 29.10, 29.31,
29.32, 30.20
Technology-intensive services 61.1, 62 (without 62.01), 63.1, 71.1, 72.1
Software supply and consultancy 62.01
Non-high-tech manufacturing 10.3 (without superior technology manufacturing
and high technology manufacturing)
Skill-intensive services 69.1, 70.2, 72.2, 73.1
102
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.2: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Financial Variables
Usage-Bank Dummy=1 if firm uses debt financing.
Usage-VC Dummy=1 if firm uses venture capital financing.
FC-Bank Dummy=1 if firm has experienced financial constraints in debt financing.
FC-VC Dummy=1 if firm has experienced financial constraints in venture capital
financing.
Demand-Bank Dummy=1 if debt financing is used or financial frictions in debt financing have
been experienced.
Demand-VC Dummy=1 if venture capital financing is used or financial frictions in venture
capital financing have been experienced.
Access-Bank Dummy=1 if debt financing is used; =0 if (1) no debt financing is used although
firm has demand for it or (2) if debt financing is used, but financial frictions in
debt financing still have been experienced.
Access-VC Dummy=1 if venture capital financing is used; =0 if (1) no venture capital
financing is used although firm has demand for it or (2) if venture capital
financing is used, but financial frictions in venture capital financing still have
been experienced.
Patent Variables
DPAT Dummy=1 if number of granted patents of company or founder is nonnegative.
PAT Number of granted patents of company or founder. Variable is truncated at
22.
VAL Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of patents for protecting its own
competitive advantage (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important")
PAT*VAL Interaction term between the number of granted patents (truncated at 22) and
the firm-specific evaluation of the importance of patents for protecting its own
competitive advantage (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Patent Functions
Imitation Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "protection
against imitation" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Finance Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "improving
access to finance" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Licensing Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "obtaining
revenues from royalties" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Negotiation Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "improving
position in negotiations" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Infringement Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "avoiding
patent infringement suits" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Reputation Firm-specific evaluation of the importance of the patent function "improving
firm reputation" (scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important").
Control Variables
SIZE Number of full-time employees.
EXPR Industry experience of the founder (in years).
EDUC Dummy=1 if founder has a university degree.
INNO Variable indicates whether a firm has introduced a market innovation since
foundation at the regional market (=1), national market (=2) or worldwide
(=3). Else, it equals zero.
CAPA Current degree of capacity utilization (in percent).
R&D Number of employees in R&D.
CORP Dummy=1 if firm is part of another corporation.
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Table B.3: Functions of patents (ordered probit)
Protection from Imitation Improving Access to Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIZE 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EXPR -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
EDUC -0.323∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.276∗ -0.006 0.005 0.019
(0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.134) (0.133) (0.134)
CORP 0.993∗∗ 0.985∗∗ 0.984∗∗ -0.433 -0.464 -0.372
(0.398) (0.397) (0.394) (0.386) (0.387) (0.384)
INNO 0.083 0.083 0.092∗ 0.096∗ 0.097∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
CAPA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.020
(0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
Demand-Bank -0.070 -0.070
(0.156) (0.142)
Demand-VC 0.106 0.538∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.180)
Usage-Bank -0.002 -0.041
(0.199) (0.170)
Usage-VC 0.146 0.605∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.207)
FC-Bank -0.102 -0.037
(0.185) (0.180)
FC-VC 0.134 0.628∗∗
(0.268) (0.296)
Observations 330 330 333 328 328 331
Notes: The table presents the coefficients from ordered probit regressions of the importance of the patent
functions "protection from imitation" and "improving access to finance". All standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and
0.10 level.
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Table B.4: Functions of patents (bivariate ordered probit)
(1) (2) (3)
Imitation Finance Imitation Finance Imitation Finance
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
SIZE 0.014 0.004 0.013 0.003 0.014 0.004
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
EXPR -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
EDUC -0.319** 0.015 -0.316** 0.026 -0.272* 0.041
(0.148) (0.134) (0.147) (0.133) (0.147) (0.134)
CORP 0.925** -0.424 0.919** -0.455 0.919** -0.363
(0.399) (0.383) (0.398) (0.384) (0.396) (0.381)
INNO 0.074 0.089* 0.074 0.090* 0.083 0.099*
(0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051)
CAPA -0.001 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D 0.009 0.003 0.01 0.003 0.011 0.022
(0.039) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027)
Demand-Bank -0.079 -0.067
(0.155) (0.142)
Demand-VC 0.097 0.538***
(0.196) (0.180)
Usage-Bank -0.017 -0.044
(0.198) (0.170)
Usage-VC 0.131 0.606***
(0.236) (0.206)
FC-Bank -0.102 -0.029
(0.185) (0.181)
FC-VC 0.136 0.631**
(0.268) (0.295)
Observations 327 327 330
Notes: The table presents the coefficients from bivariate ordered probit regressions. The determinants for the
importance of the patent functions "protection from imitation" and "improving access to finance" are jointly
estimated for each alternative financial measure. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. ***,
**, * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition and Source
Parent-level
yict Binary location variable that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host
country c in year t and zero else. Source: MiDi
Productivity Logarithm of the ratio of sales over employees. Source: MiDi
Parent-sector-level
R&D Expenditures for innovation over total sales among German industries. Source:
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
PATEFF Perception-based measure of the effectiveness of patents for protecting product
innovation. Source: Cohen et al. (2000)
Affiliate-level
Log(Sales) Logarithm of affiliate sales. Source: MiDi
Log(FDI) Stock of direct investment (IMF/OECD method, see Lipponer (2006) for
details). Source: MiDi
Log(Employees) Logarithm of total number of an affiliate’s employees. Source: MiDi
Ownership share Share of affiliate’s equity held by German parent. Source: MiDi
Fixed/Total Assets Fixed over total assets. Source: MiDi
Profitability Profit over total assets. Source: MiDi
Country-level
PAT Index of patent protection that covers the five categories extent of coverage,
membership in international patent agreements, duration of protection,
enforcement mechanisms and provisions for loss of patent protection. The
categories are scored with values ranging from 0-1 and an unweighted sum
(0-5) is constructed. Source: Park (2008); Ginarte and Park (1997)
PERC-IPR Perception-based index of intellectual property right protection, 1-7 (best).
Source: World Economic Forum
Corporate Tax Statutory corporate tax rate. Sources: Various issues of corporate tax guides
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Coopers&Lybrand, Ernst&Young and
information from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD)
Schooling Share of pupils that progress to secondary school. Source: World Bank
Development Indicator
Log(GDPpc) Logarithm of GDP per capita. Source: World Bank Development Indicator
Exports Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank
Development Indicator
Rule of Law Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption). Source: Heritage
Foundation
Trade Openness Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). Source:
Heritage Foundation
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Table C.2: Patent protection across countries
Country Mean SD Country Mean SD Country Mean SD
Algeria 2.96 0.19 Guyana 1.41 0.33 Pakistan 1.99 0.54
Argentina 3.56 0.72 Honduras 2.58 0.59 Panama 2.91 1.26
Australia 4.17 0.00 Hong Kong 3.51 0.53 Paraguay 2.27 0.69
Austria 4.29 0.07 Hungary 4.19 0.27 Peru 3.12 0.34
Bangladesh 1.87 0.00 India 2.42 1.27 Philippines 3.57 0.88
Belgium 4.63 0.08 Indonesia 2.27 0.63 Poland 3.86 0.38
Bolivia 3.08 0.61 Iran 1.91 0.00 Portugal 4.03 0.52
Brazil 2.89 1.22 Ireland 4.49 0.31 Romania 3.80 0.33
Bulgaria 4.06 0.72 Israel 3.80 0.57 Russian Federation 3.61 0.12
Cameroon 2.46 0.52 Italy 4.56 0.20 Saudi Arabia 2.21 0.66
Canada 4.56 0.19 Jamaica 3.09 0.25 Senegal 2.34 0.52
Chile 4.16 0.21 Japan 4.59 0.14 Slovak Republic 3.38 0.72
China 3.10 0.98 Jordan 2.51 1.26 Spain 4.29 0.07
Columbia 3.35 0.53 Kenya 2.84 0.40 Sweden 4.50 0.07
Congo 2.40 0.60 South Korea 4.12 0.22 Switzerland 4.29 0.07
Costa 2.45 0.77 Lithuania 3.39 0.66 Tanzania 2.53 0.18
Cyprus 3.25 0.40 Luxembourg 4.06 0.14 Thailand 2.53 0.13
Czech Republic 3.50 0.73 Malaysia 3.07 0.39 Trinidad and Tobago 3.24 0.79
Democratic Congo 1.86 0.33 Malta 2.75 1.01 Tunisia 2.41 0.80
Denmark 4.63 0.08 Marocco 2.79 0.90 Turkey 3.56 0.79
Egypt 2.12 0.57 Mauritius 2.14 0.37 USA 4.88 0.00
El Salvator 3.36 0.13 Mexico 3.57 0.38 Uganda 2.94 0.08
Ethiopia 1.38 1.19 Mozambique 1.26 1.17 Ukraine 3.68 0.00
Finland 4.54 0.13 Nepal 1.92 0.23 United Kingdom 4.54 0.00
France 4.63 0.08 Netherlands 4.63 0.08 Uruguay 2.91 0.73
Ghana 3.11 0.26 New Zealand 4.01 0.00 Venezuela 3.15 0.29
Greece 3.91 0.42 Nigeria 2.97 0.18 Vietnam 2.94 0.08
Guatemala 1.84 1.14 Norway 4.14 0.15 Zambia 1.77 0.16
Overall mean 3.24
Overall standard deviation 1.03
Between standard deviation 0.93
Within standard deviation 0.46
Notes: The Table presents the country means for the time-varying Ginarte-Park index of patent protection.
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Table C.3: Industry characteristics
NACE 1 Code Industry R&D PATEFF
1500 Manufacture of food products, beverages 1.40 18.26
1600 Manufacture of tobacco products 1.37 -
1700 Manufacture of textiles 1.94 20.00
1800 Manufacture of textile products 1.95 -
1900 Manufacture of leather, leather products 1.92 -
2000 Manufacture of wood, wood products 3.16 -
2100 Manufacture of pulp, paper, paper products 3.13 36.94
2200 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 3.16 12.08
2300 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 4.64 33.33
2400 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products 4.44 37.46
2440 Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 4.20 50.20
2500 Manufacture of rubber, plastic products 3.65 32.71
2600 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2.92 21.11
2700 Manufacture of basic metals 2.74 20.00
2800 Manufacture of metal products 2.74 39.43
2900 Manufacture of machinery, equipment n.e.c. 4.80 42.94
3000 Manufacture of office machinery, computers 6.90 41.00
3100 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus 6.85 34.55
3200 Manufacture of radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 7.21 25.82
3300 Manufacture of medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks 8.23 40.43
3400 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 6.84 43.09
3500 Manufacture of other transport equipment 6.07 -
3510 Building, repairing of ships, boats 7.94 -
3520 Manufacture of railed vehicles 7.94 -
3530 Manufacture of aircraft, spacecraft 7.94 32.92
3540 Manufacture of motorcycles, bicycles, invalid 7.94 -
3550 Manufacture of other transport equipment 7.94 -
3600 Manufacture of furniture, Manufactureacturing 2.60 33.81
3700 Recycling 2.62 -
4000 Electricity, gas, steam, hot water supply 0.60 -
Industry average 4.41 32.43
Industry standard deviation 2.40 9.93
Notes: The Table presents the values for the time-constant measure of patent effectiveness (PATEFF) and
the mean values for the time-varying measures of R&D intensity (R&D). All definitions of the variable are
summarized in Table C.1.
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Table C.4: Entry decision (with country-year FE)
Dependent variable: Location
(1) (2)
Productivity 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0013)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PAT*R&D 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0004)
R&D -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0018)
Observations 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1958 0.1943
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm,
with ***, **, * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the
binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent
i holds an affiliate in host country c in year t. All
specifications include country-year, year and parent
fixed effects.
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Table C.6: Ownership (with country-year FE)
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2)
Productivity -0.0027 -0.0018
(0.0033) (0.0031)
Log(Sales) 0.0030 0.0024
(0.0030) (0.0029)
Profitability -0.0253 -0.0313∗
(0.0180) (0.0166)
Fix/Total Assets -0.0157 -0.0153
(0.0161) (0.0155)
PAT*PATEFF -0.0002
(0.0002)
R&D 0.0112
(0.0110)
PAT*R&D -0.0018
(0.0024)
Observations 10330 10904
Indiv. Parents 2393 2525
Destinations 72 73
Adjusted R2 0.3178 0.3207
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with
***, **, * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. All specifications include country-year, year
and parent fixed effects. Additionally, dummies for an
affiliate’s age and sector are included.
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Table C.8: Entry decision with perception-based IPR index
Dependent variable: Location decision
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Corporate Tax -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Rule of Law -0.0001∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Trade Openness -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PERC-IPR 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0016)
PERC-IPR*PATEFF 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PERC-IPR*R&D 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003)
R&D -0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0012)
Observations 657031 601315 631966
Indiv. Parents 2226 2026 2140
Destinations 98 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.1742 0.1815 0.1774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is
the binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in
host country c in year t. All specifications include country, year and parent fixed
effects. The sample covers the years 2006-2010.
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Table C.10: Ownership share of foreign affiliates with perception-based IPR index
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0012
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Log(GDPpc) -0.0049 -0.0023 -0.0067
(0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0136)
Corporate Tax -0.0013∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
School System -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Exports -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Rule of Law -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade Openness 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
PERC-IPR 0.0028 0.0207 0.0167∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0142) (0.0071)
PERC-IPR*PATEFF -0.0005
(0.0003)
PERC-IPR*R&D -0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0009)
R&D 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0046)
Observations 24816 22965 23957
Indiv. Parents 2177 1981 2093
Destinations 84 82 84
Adjusted R2 0.4738 0.4670 0.4739
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include
country, year and parent fixed effects. Additionally, dummies for an affiliate’s
age and sector are included. The sample covers the years 2006-2010.
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